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CAPITALISM AND THE TAX SYSTEM:
A SEARCH FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
Beverly I. Moran*
ABSTRACT
America is a country founded on ideas. The Enlightenment presented
one set of ideas that attended our birth, and one Enlightenment belief that
is as strong today as during the revolution is our faith in capitalism and the
protection of private property. Yet the United States tax system manages to
violate fundamental capitalist principles, as outlined in the extensive writ-
ings of Adam Smith-the father of capitalism. Comparing Smith's vision
to the current United States tax system reveals many important inconsisten-
cies, particularly the current penchant for simultaneously taxing wages
while exempting (or delaying) taxes on wealth and wealth appreciation.
This Article proposes bringing the U.S. tax system more closely in line with
Smith's capitalist vision by introducing a combined wealth and consump-
tion tax, each with significant exemption amounts. The expected result of a
combined wealth and consumption tax system is the release of a considera-
ble portion of the population from tax liability. Less expected rewards of a
tax system that more closely resembles Smith's capitalist ideal include: (a)
support for a "Living Wage"; (b) class-based affirmative action; and (c)
reparations for slavery.
"The middling and superior ranks of people, if they understood their
own interest, ought always to oppose all taxes upon the necessaries of life,
as well as all direct taxes upon the wages of labour" Adam Smith, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
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Capitalism and the Tax System
I. INTRODUCTION-A CALL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
WEALTH TAX
HIS Article uses the writings of the father of capitalism, Adam
Smith, to imagine an ideal twenty-first-century United States tax
system. Based on Smith's extensive writings on taxation, this Arti-
cle concludes that Smith's capitalist ideals, the federal government's ad-
ministrative capacity, and twenty-first-century American notions of
political, cultural, and social fairness are all well served by combining a
wealth tax with a large exemption amount and a flat rate with a compre-
hensive consumption tax having a refundable feature up to the "Living
Wage."' In addition to supporting capitalist ideals, this combination of
wealth and consumption taxes could support social-justice agendas such
as a "Living Wage," class-based affirmative action, a flat proportional
rate, and reparations for slavery.2 These additional aspects of combining
a wealth tax and consumption tax with a generous refundable credit are a
direct reflection of the capitalist ideals of universal prosperity and politi-
cal liberty that serve as the foundation for American politics.
3
A natural question (as presented in section II of this Article) is why the
United States Congress might consider Adam Smith as its consultant
when considering a combined wealth tax and consumption tax both with
a large exemption. The answer this article proposes in section III is that
the present federal tax system falls short of a capitalist ideal due to anti-
1. Although the vast majority of United States tax scholarship centers on the income
tax, there are many other types of taxes used throughout the United States and the rest of
the world. These taxes are distinguished amongst themselves by what they tax (i.e., the tax
base), what event causes the laying of the tax (i.e., the tax trigger), and the rate the tax
employs. These taxes are also distinguished by whether they are direct taxes (a tax on the
thing itself) or indirect taxes (a tax on a transaction in the thing). See RICHARD A. Mus-
GRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 219-26 (4th
ed. 1984) (discussing the various types of taxes and their incidence). See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1500 (8th ed. 2004) (defining tax base as "the total property, income, or
wealth subject to taxation in a given jurisdiction"); id. at 1502 (defining tax rate as "a
mathematical figure for calculating a tax, usually as a percentage"); 1 THE NEW PAL-
GRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 847-49 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter
Newman eds., 1987) [hereinafter THE NEW PALGRAVE] (defining direct taxes); 2 id. at
787-88 (defining indirect taxes). An income tax is a direct tax on income. If the tax is only
on a specific type of income (e.g., wages) then it is a specific income tax such as the social
security wage tax in the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). If the tax tries to reach all
income then it is a comprehensive income tax. See infra note 76. See also 4 THE NEW
PALGRAVE, supra, at 604-06 (defining and discussing the taxation of income).
2. A wealth tax is a direct tax on wealth. If the tax is only on a specific type of wealth
(e.g., land or securities) then it is a specific wealth tax. If the tax tries to reach all forms of
wealth then it is a comprehensive wealth tax. See 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE, supra note 1, at
606-08 (defining and discussing the taxation of wealth).
3. See generally MICHAEL BEAUD, A HISTORY OF CAPITALISM 1500-2000 (Tom
Dickman & Amy Lefebuse, trans., Monthly Rev. Press 5th ed. 2001) (1981); PAUL
BOWLES, CAPITALISM (2007); FREDERIC JAMESON, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPI-
TALISM (1991); ALAIN LIPIETZ, TOWARDS A NEW ECONOMIC ORDER: POSTFORDISM,
ECOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY (1992). For various perspectives on how United States tax
laws serve to further political ideals, see generally, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN &
ANNE ALSTOTT, STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999); Marjorie Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax
Rate Structure in the Face of Disagreement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1697 (2005).
2008]
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quated eighteenth and nineteenth-century cultural and political con-
straints that are of no consequence in the twenty-first century. The article
continues in section IV to show how a combined wealth tax and con-
sumption tax, both with a large exemption, is well suited to twenty-first-
century administrative capacity, as well as to its contemporary political,
cultural, and social constraints. Section V discusses how the combined
wealth tax and consumption tax can shelter a "Living Wage" through the
application of basic capitalist principles. Finally section VI compares the
combined wealth tax and consumption tax with the present hybrid in-
come/consumption tax in order to illustrate the social benefits conferred
by the combined tax system.4
II. SMITH AS A GUIDE TO A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TAX
This section introduces Adam Smith as a guide to a twenty-first-cen-
tury Congress in search of an ideal tax system. Smith's fit as a congres-
sional consultant arises from his search for the roots of universal material
prosperity, the specific role he saw for taxation in that project, and his
real world tax experience, as reflected in both his idealistic and prescrip-
tive writings.5
A. WHY ADAM SMITH?
Scholars from both the Right and Left opine that capitalism is a precur-
sor to democracy. 6 As a democratic institution, Congress is well served by
a tax consultant whose philosophy established a necessary precondition
to its own existence. Adam Smith is widely acknowledged as the father
4. For two other discussions of the role of wealth taxes in promoting social justice
concerns, see generally ACKERMAN & ALSTOTr, supra note 3; MELVIN L. OLIVER &
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RA-
CIAL INEQUALITY (1995).
5. Adam Smith was a prominent member of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlight-
enment that included other notable figures, such as Dr. James Anderson, Adam Ferguson,
David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, Lord Kames, John Millar, Thomas Reid, William Rob-
ertson, Sir James Steuart, and Dugald Stewart. See Alexander Broadie, Introduction to
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE SCOTrISH ENLIGHTENMENT 2 (Alexander Broadie
ed., 2003); Alexander Broadie, Introduction to THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: AN AN-
THOLOGY 3-31 (Alexander Broadie ed., 1997); Knud Haakonssen, Introduction to THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ADAM SMITH 3 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2006); DANIEL SOM-
MER ROBINSON, THE STORY OF SCOT-rISH PHILOSOPHY (1961) (discussing nine pre-emi-
nent Scottish philosophers that include Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith,
Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, Sir William Hamilton, James Frederick
Ferrier, and James McCosh). For a discussion of enlightenment thinkers and taxation, see,
e.g., David G. Duff, Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World: A Critical
Review, 28 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 23, 24-28 (2005) (Locke and taxation); see generally Edward
J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994).
6. See, e.g., BOWLES, supra note 3, at 42-47; MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 9 (1962) ("The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom
directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it sepa-
rates economic power from political power, and, in this way, enables the one to offset the
other."); ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM 9 (2007) (arguing that capitalism is almost
certainly a precondition for democracy).
[Vol. 61
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of both capitalism and modern economics. 7 Beyond his contribution to
the social sciences and humanities, Smith was a proponent of social jus-
tice whose entire project, from his exploration of the development of
moral responsibility and sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, to
his examination of the role of law and government in guiding human be-
havior in The Lectures on Jurisprudence, to his investigation of the cause
of different economic outcomes across nations in An Inquiry into the Na-
ture and Causes of the Wealth of Nations ("The Wealth of Nations"), was a
search for the necessary components of universal material prosperity and
natural political liberty.8 Although Smith is thought of as a conservative
economist whose work is available to attack social legislation, Smith actu-
ally stood for capitalism as a path to a better life across social classes. 9
7. See generally, e.g., ADAM SMITH AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 1776-1976: Bi-
CENTENNIAL ESSAYS (Fred R. Glahe ed., 1978); ADAM SMITH'S WEALTH OF NATIONS:
NEW INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS (Stephen Copley & Kathryn Sutherland eds., 1995);
Roger J. Flynn, Smith, Adam (1723-1790), in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ACTIVISM AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 1292-93 (Gary Anderson & Kathryn Herr eds., 2007). For bibliographies on
Adam Smith, see A CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF ADAM SMITH, AUTHOR OF THE
'MORAL SENTIMENT' AND 'THE WEALTH OF NATIONS' (James Bonar ed., 2d ed. 1932); A
CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ADAM SMITH (Keith Tribe & Hiroshi Mizuta eds., 2002);
ADAM SMITH'S LIBRARY: A CATALOGUE (Hiroshi Mizuta ed., 2000). In addition to his
contribution to economics, Smith draws on so many other sources that his research is a
model for the twenty-first-century university with its emphasis on interdisciplinary work.
See generally Henry J. Bittermann, Adam Smith's Empiricism and the Law of Nature: 1, 48
J. POL. ECON. 487 (1940). Smith was both a humanist and an empiricist who grounded his
work in philosophy, history, and empirical observation. David Lieberman, Adam Smith on
Justice Rights, and Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ADAM SMITH, supra note 5, at
228 (discussing the interdisciplinary nature of Smith's work); Bittermann, Adam Smith's
Empiricism and the Law of Nature I, supra, at 488; Henry J. Bittermann, Adam Smith's
Empiricism and the Law of Nature: 11, 48 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1940). In addition to econom-
ics, Smith constantly mined history-ancient, medieval, and modern- to illustrate his
views. For a discussion of Smith's limitations as a historian, see Introduction to 1 ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 50-60
(R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1981) (1776) [hereinafter WEALTH OF NATIONS].
Smith was also an internationalist, a believer in free trade and in the free flow of ideas who
was influenced by the French and other foreign sources. EMMA ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC
SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 52-71 (2001).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES,
TIMES, AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 53 (7th ed. 1999). Smith's three
works made such an impact on the modern academy that some credit Smith with pioneer-
ing three modern social sciences: economics, political science, and sociology. See generally
Albert Salomon, Adam Smith as Sociologist, 12 Soc. RES. 22 (1945).
9. Because Smith believed that government activities that burden the proper working
of the market system distort prices to the detriment of the people, he also believed that all
government impediments to the proper working of the market must be abolished. This
wish to prevent government from distorting the market has been misinterpreted: "But
because any act of the government-even such laws as those requiring the whitewashing of
factories or preventing the shackling of children to machines-could be interpreted as
hampering the free operation of the market[,] The Wealth of Nations was liberally quoted
to oppose the first humanitarian legislation. Thus, by a strange injustice, the man who
warned that the grasping eighteenth-century industrialists 'generally have an interest to
deceive and even to oppress the public' came to be regarded as their economic patron
saint. Even today, in blithe disregard of his actual philosophy, Smith is generally regarded
as a conservative economist, whereas in fact he was more avowedly hostile to the motives
of businessmen than are most contemporary liberal economists." HEILBRONER, supra note
8, at 70.
2008]
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Smith's familiarity with taxation included both his father's work as a
customs clerk and his own work as a tax collector and consultant to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer.10 Smith wrote extensively about taxation
in The Wealth of Nations and, to a lesser extent, in his other works as well.
Unlike some philosophers, Smith had a specific role for taxation within
his overall scheme for universal prosperity.1 Universal prosperity is a
heartening ideal at a time when many Americans face declining afflu-
ence. 12 In order for the tax system to fully contribute to his larger pro-ject, Smith's tax directives for the twenty-first-century United States
10. In addition to consulting with Lord Townsend, Smith was also the personal tutor to
the Chancellor of the Exchequer's stepson. Id. at 48. Moreover, in 1778, two years after
the publication of Wealth of Nations, Smith was appointed Commissioner of Customs of
Edinburgh. Id. at 50; see also IAN SIMPSON Ross, THE LIFE OF ADAM SMITH 223, 305(1995). As a person who both administered taxes and advised others on tax administra-
tion, Smith showed a fine sense for the wide array of taxes available both within and
outside of Britain, their advantages, faults, and incidence. "British taxes, at the time of the
publication of The Wealth of Nations, were of four principle sorts. There were taxes on
land, stamp duties, duties of customs and duties of excise." Emma Rothschild & Amartya
Sen, Adam Smith's Economics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ADAM SMITH, supra
note 5, at 354 (citing 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 934). "William Pitt intro-
duced the first, temporary income tax in Britain only in 1799." Id. (citing P.K. O'Brien,
The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660-1815, 41 ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (1988)).
Thus, although all of Smith's works strove to draw on practical experience and to provide
realistic guidance, Smith's own extensive familiarity with tax administration is worthy of
note in an examination of Smith's writings on taxation.
11. Many fields claim Smith. Philosophers point out that Smith employed philosophi-
cal methods when he examined other authors' ideas as if they were present, alive, and fully
engaged in the argument, because an essential part of the Philosopher's faith is that rea-
soning can rise, on occasion, above the prejudice and concerns of historical time. SAMUEL
FLEISCHACKER, ON ADAM SMITH'S WEALTH OF NATIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL COMPANION
xvi (2004). Among the Enlightenment's opponents, Smith's rejection of a social order de-
rived from Heaven and its replacement by human reason and empirical observation as the
means of ordering human affairs helped gain economists the reputation as the ultimate
Enlightenment thinkers. See ROTHSCHILD, supra note 7, at 17-18. Although Smith used
reason, he did not believe in reason as the sole basis for explaining the social world. See
Salomon, supra note 8, at 22-42. In addition to reason, Smith's expansive examination of
morality, justice, and government was grounded in extensive historical and empirical ob-
servation. See generally Bittermann, Adam Smith's Empiricism and the Law of Nature: I,
supra note 7; Bittermann, Adam Smith's Empiricism and the Law of Nature: II, supra note
7.
12. REICH, supra note 6, at 105-14 (showing the shift in increases in overall income
from the bottom twenty percent to the top one percent); see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 1979 TO 2005 6-7 (2007), http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/88xx/doc8885/12-11-HistoricalTaxRates.pdf (showing that incomes of the top one
percent of Americans from 2003 to 2005 exceeded the total income of the poorest twenty
percent of Americans); see generally CHUCK COLLINS & FELICE YESKEL, ECONOMIC
APARTHEID IN AMERICA (2000); SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTTSCHALK, AMERICA
UNEQUAL 124-50 (1995) (noting the increases in income inequality); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J.
1391, 1398 (2002); Andrew Hacker, The Underworld of Work, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Feb. 12,
2004, at 38, 40 (citing 2002 Bureau of the Census data to show that forty percent of full
time workers in 2000 earned less than $30,000 per year); David Cay Johnston, Report Says
that the Rich are Getting Richer Faster, Much Faster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at C3;
Gretchen Morgenson, Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss Is Paid So Much, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2004, at C1 (noting that the pay American CEOs receive is 531 times greater than that
of the average employee, whereas the differential in Great Britain is only twenty-five,
twenty-one in Canada, and ten in Japan).
[Vol. 61
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suggest a consumption tax with an exemption, a refundable credit up to
the "Living Wage," and a wealth tax with an exemption large enough to
maintain that "Living Wage" during economic hardship.
B. WHY A COMPREHENSIVE WEALTH TAX?
At the risk of stating the obvious-people do not like taxes. In fact,
antipathy to taxes is so high that laying taxes is difficult to justify. Many
theorists rationalize taxation through benefits. 13 Smith is a benefit theo-
rist because he explicitly tied taxes to benefits. 14 In part, Smith joined
taxes and benefits because he believed that those who both benefit from,
and pay for, government services are more likely to properly regulate
their collection and use.15 In part, Smith sees binding taxes to benefits as
a way of avoiding political unrest, because reasonable people are willing
to pay for well-priced government goods and services. 16 At base, Smith
13. See generally Roy Blough, Basic Tax Issues, in CONFERENCE PAPERS ON THE His-
TORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF TAXATION 17 (1955); C. Lovell Harriss, The Role of Taxation in
a Free Enterprise System, in CONFERENCE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF
TAXATION (1955); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES
AND JUSTICE (2002); Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit,
Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399 (2005); Kornhauser, supra
note 3 (choosing a rate structure involves fundamental questions about the nature of gov-
ernment and distributive justice); D.T. Krauss, The Benefit Theory of Taxation, 11 TENN. L.
REV. 226 (1933); Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation,
Globalization, and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731 (2000); Leo P. Martinez, "To
Lay and Collect Taxes": The Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 111 (1999); Herwig J. Schlunk, Double Taxation: The Unappreciated Ideal, 102
TAX NOTES 893, 895 (Feb. 16, 2004); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness-
A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 221 (1995); Klaus Vogel, The Justification for Taxation: A Forgotten Question,
33 AM. J. JuRIs. 19 (1988).
14. For example, Smith told us that local people should pay taxes for local benefits
such as lights, water, and sewage. 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 815. Litigants
should pay taxes for part of the administration of justice through stamp taxes and filing
fees. Id. at 814-15. Students should pay a portion of the cost of education through a direct
payment of teachers' salaries. Id. at 815. Transporters should pay the cost of highways,
bridges, and canals and then pass the cost onto consumers who benefit from the overall
drop in prices that better transportation affords. Id. Ground rents should be set at higher
rates than other types of taxes because ground rents are unique riches brought on by gov-
ernment services. Id. at 840.
15. "The expence of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the ex-
pence of management to the joint tenants of a great estate .. " Id. at 825.
16. "Nothing can be more reasonable than that a fund which owes its existence to the
good government of the state, should be taxed peculiarly, or should contribute something
more than the greater part of other funds, towards the support of that government." Id. at
844. "It seems not unreasonable, that the extraordinary expence, which the protection of
any particular branch of commerce may occasion, should be defrayed by a moderate tax
upon that particular branch; by a moderate fine, for example, to be paid by the traders
when they first enter into it, or, what is more equal, by a particular duty of so much per
cent [sic] upon the goods which they either import into, or export out of, the particular
countries with which it is carried on. The protection of trade in general, from pirates and
freebooters, is said to have given occasion to the first institution of the duties of customs.
But, if it was thought reasonable to lay a general tax upon trade, in order to defray the
expence of protecting trade in general, it should seem equally reasonable to lay a particular
tax upon a particular branch of trade, in order to defray the extraordinary expence of
protecting that branch." Id. at 732.
2008]
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connected taxes to benefits because of his theory of the relationship be-
tween private property and government.
Smith believed that private property-when properly distributed-al-
lowed for a level of prosperity for the working classes that rivals the
riches of royalty in less well-managed societies, and that the creation and
protection of property is dependent on the interplay of market and gov-
ernment.1 7 Thus, although government does not contribute directly to
successful economic activity, government provides many of the prerequi-
sites to a successful economy. Government-properly formed and man-
aged-contributes to universal prosperity by helping protect from outside
oppression, providing justice at home, and balancing market distortions
by providing goods that are too diffuse for private financing. 18 Just as
there was a role for government in Smith's ideal world, there was a role
for the taxes to support the government that allowed for private property
and political freedom. 19
Although Smith identified many types of government benefits in his
analysis of tax systems, these items are mere proxies for what Smith be-
lieved is the true purpose of government: the protection of the rich and
their property from the poor and their envy. Smith saw people balanced
between opposing forces: selfishness on the one hand, and the need for
approval on the other. Self-love and self-advancement-which pre-En-
lightenment thought condemned as self aggrandizing, anti-Christian, and
anti-social-Smith saw as advancing the cause of universal prosperity by
providing the motivation to constantly strive for better conditions. 20
Smith believed that, before the creation of private property, the negative
consequences of self-love were balanced by the countervailing need for
17. ADAM SMITH, 1 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 10 ("[A] workman, even of
the lowest and poorest order,... may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conve-
niences of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire.").
18. The Wealth of Nations Book V concerns three major topics: public expenditure,
taxation, and public finance. Within the context of the Sovereign's duties and their finance,
Smith identifies the Sovereign's duties as protecting the people from outside oppression
("Of the Expence of Defence"), domestic justice ("Of the Expence of Justice"), and the
creation and provision of diffuse benefits ("Of the Expence of publick Works and publick
Institutions"). 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 689, 708, 724. Primarily these
benefits consist of education and the protection of domestic and foreign commerce. The
facilitation of domestic commerce includes facilitation of some transportation through the
production of roads, canals, and bridges. Id. at 724.
19. Property is also the basis for liberty because property creates a counterbalance to
government. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 9.
20. Introduction to 1 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 9-18. For Smith, man was
an active being, disposed to pursue certain objectives which may be motivated by a desire
to be thought well of by his fellows, but which at the same time may lead him to take
actions which have hurtful consequences as far as others are concerned. It is indeed one of
Smith's more striking achievements to have recognized the social objective of many eco-
nomic goals in remarking: "It is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that
we pursue riches and avoid poverty. For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this
world? What is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power and pre-
eminence? . . . what are the advantages we propose by that great purpose of human life
which we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken
notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we
can propose to derive from it." Id. at 9-10; 1 WEALTh OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 25.
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esteem and that, absent private property, reason and external esteem me-
diate between individuals without state intervention. However, once pri-
vate property was introduced into human society, reason and esteem
could no longer restrain envy.2 1 Private property creates the motivation
for the dangerous behavior government defends against. Thus, private
property and civil government are twins born in the same moment.22 The
interplay between the selfish pursuit of one's own interests and the con-
tribution to the public benefit that private property provides is mediated
in the market and by the State, which supplies the necessary precondi-
tions for private ownership. 23 Thus, property (or, in other words, wealth)
is the ultimate government benefit and, therefore, the proper base for a
comprehensive tax system.2 4 Thus, a tax system directed at property own-
ership that also promotes ownership, at least up to the amount needed to
support the "Living Wage," reflects the capitalist ideals that helped found
this nation, because although government is born of the need for the rich
to protect themselves against the poor, it turns out that the best way to
gain a stable society that encourages wealth creation is through the wide
dispersion of material and cultural goods. Smith's writings on taxation
offer a way to match a tax system to the underlying ideals of the govern-
ment that the tax system supports.2 5
21. Introduction to 1 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7 at 11-12: "Smith... argue[s]
that .. .wealth . . .opens up an important source of dispute .... [W]here people are
prompted by malice or resentment to hurt one another, and where they can be harmed
only in respect of person or reputation, then men may live together with some degree of
harmony; the point being . . . 'the greater part of men are not very frequently under the
influence of those passions; and the worst men are so only occasionally' . . . [b]ut in a
situation where property can be acquired ... we find a situation which tends to give full
rein to avarice and ambition." Id.
22. "Property and civil government very much depend on one another. The preserva-
tion of property and the inequality of possession first formed it, and the state of property
must always vary with the form of government." It is this basic thesis of Smith's-that
property and civil government, and therefore positive law (which is the creature of civil
government), are closely intertwined-which is the greatest interest to us. He put the
same point another way: "Till there be property there can be no government, the very end
of which is to secure wealth and to defend the rich from the poor." Neil MacCormack,
Adam Smith on Law, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 250 (1981) (citing ADAM SMITH, LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1976)).
23. Introduction to 1 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 17-18.
24. "Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich
man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the
indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who
are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only
under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is
acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep
a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom,
though he never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be
protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise
it." 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 709.
25. Smith was explicit about his preference for a wealth tax. In Lectures on Jurispru-
dence, Smith opined that all taxes are either taxes on possessions (which Smith identified
as land, stock, or money) or taxes on commodities (such as salt, cloth, or alcoholic bever-
ages). See generally ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R.L. Meek et al. eds.,
Clarendon Press 1996) (1762). ("All taxes may be considered under two divisions, to witt,
taxes upon possessions and taxes upon consumption. These are the two ways of making
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C. WHY A LARGE EXEMPTION?
There are two reasons why Smith would advocate a large exemption in
the context of a comprehensive wealth tax: his belief in shared prosperity
and the mildly progressive rate that results from a large exemption and a
flat rate. 26
the subjects contribute to the support of government. The land tax is of the former kind,
and all taxes upon commodities is of the latter."); see also R.A. Musgrave, Adam Smith on
Public Finance and Distribution, in THE MARKET AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
ADAM SMITH 308 (Thomas Wilson & Andrew Skinner eds., 1976). According to Smith,
taxes on commodities either increase the cost of labor, thereby indirectly increasing prices
or decreasing supply. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra, at 531 ("When taxes are laid
upon commodities, their prices must rise, the concurrence of tradesmen must be pre-
vented, an artificial dearth occasioned, less industry excited, and a smaller quantity of
goods produced."). Yet, although Smith preferred to tax possessions, he was faced with
cultural restrictions concerning privacy and political restrictions in the form of a lack of
administrative capacity that leaves land as the only plausible possession for the eighteenth-
century British government to tax. In contrast, the challenge of taxing either stock or
money in the same administrative environment left those possessions virtually exempt
from taxation. Id. ("Possessions are of three kinds, to witt, land, stock and money. It is
easy to levy a tax upon land because it is evident what quantity every one possesses, but it
is very difficult to lay tax upon stock or money without very arbitrary proceedings."). As
between possessions and commodities, Smith preferred a wealth tax on possessions. How-
ever, Smith's preference for a wealth tax was only partially satisfied in eighteenth-century
Britain because the central government's administrative capacity was better suited to tax-
ing commodities. Nevertheless, a large part of eighteenth-century British revenue did
come from a wealth tax on land. See infra note 77. In the present day United States, the
hurdles that kept Britain from a comprehensive wealth tax are resolved by superior capac-
ity. For a discussion of limits on the federal government's ability to lay wealth taxes, see
generally Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990). For
arguments against using a wealth tax as a means of addressing societal ills, see Eric Rakow-
ski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263 (2000). For discussions of the
practicalities of taxing wealth, see generally ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 3; David
G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIs. 3 (1993).
26. An exemption is an amount that is completely exempt from taxation without the
taxpayer having to produce any proof of how the amount was used. In the current Internal
Revenue Code, the exemption is based on statutory criteria regarding dependency. I.R.C.
§ 151 (2000). See infra notes 59 to 73 for a discussion regarding the mildly progressive rate.
There is a third reason that Smith would advocate a large exemption: his view that direct
taxes on labor distort natural price. Smith's theory of the market posits two prices: market
price and natural price. Natural price reflects the value embedded in an object by labor.
Market price is influenced by other concerns such as supply and demand. Introduction to 1
WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 20 (citing LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 25, at 552-53); see also 1 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 65-71. Goods become
widely available at a fair price when natural price and market price match. Unfortunately
there are a number of factors that can upset the balance between natural and market price
including a poorly designed tax system. Introduction to 1 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note
7, at 20 (citing LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 26, at 555). Smith opined that
when market price is not in line with natural price then labor shifts out of the field where
the market is below the natural price and into the field where the market price is above the
natural price. According to Smith, a direct tax on labor distorts the match between natural
price and market price because the cost of labor is already reflected in natural price.
Therefore, government actions that increase the cost of labor (for example a direct tax on
wages) increase natural price and adversely affect supply. Id. ("Progressing logically from
this point, Smith proceeded to show that any policy that prevented the market price of
goods from coinciding with their supply price ... would tend to diminish public opulence
and derange the distribution of stock between different employments."). For Smith, indi-
rect taxes on labor are even worse than direct taxes because of the additional costs associ-
ated with collection. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 25, at 583 ("The taxes on
consumptions are not so much murmured against, because they are laid upon the
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1. Shared Prosperity and Smith's Theory of Necessaries
Smith devotes a full section of Book V to a discussion of the taxation of
consumable commodities. 27 Smith divides consumable commodities into
either necessaries or luxuries.28 In Smith's view, all taxes are paid out of
one of three sources: rents, profits, or wages; and for each of these three
sources of tax revenues, the ideal tax system separates compensation for
risk-taking from actual profit. 29 Accordingly, the ideal tax system ex-
empts the minimum compensation needed to take on the risk of capital to
the capitalist, and it also exempts the cost of necessary commodities (in
Smith's parlance, "necessaries") for the working class. 30 Since most of
what workers earn goes to necessaries, Smith saw direct taxes on both
necessaries and wages as inevitably resulting in either an increase in the
cost of labor, or a decrease in the availability of employment.31
Part of Smith's three-part project is a theory of natural justice. 32 Part of
merchant, who lays them on the price of the goods, and thus are insensibly paid by the
people."). The cost associated with both direct and indirect taxes on wages are eventually
borne by the consumer through higher prices. 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at
873. Accordingly, either direct or indirect taxes on labor hurt the public. On the other
hand, for Smith, surplus profit is open to taxation subject to his four tax ideals and several
other themes that he developed in Book V. These additional themes included the direc-
tions that: (1) Taxes should be laid so that they have the least effect on prices; (2) Taxes
are justified by government benefits; and (3) Tax systems should specifically identify and
tax those whom government benefits. For example, Smith approved of taxes on the weight
of wagons that use the public highways because the tax has the least effect on the cost of
goods. According to Smith, the tax will actually be passed onto the consumer. However,
because the roads make it cheaper to bring the goods to market, the decrease in price
created by the roads more than offsets the increase in price caused by the tax that is used
to support the roads. Id. at 724-25. Smith also liked the highway tax because the tax is tied
directly to the use. In other words, the tax is used to maintain the roads, which are then
used by the people who pay the tax, and their payment of the tax by weight is a good proxy
for the actual stress that the taxpayer/transporters put on the roads. Id. Once again, the
highway tax fits the ideal by matching the beneficiary to the cost. Id. at 848-49. Smith's
theory of price has been supplanted by the utility theory of price which is better known as
the law of supply and demand. For a discussion of the changes in economic thinking on the
matter of price see generally, ROBERT B. EKELUND & ROBERT F. HERBERT, A HISTORY
OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND METHOD (5th ed. 2007).
27. 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 869-906.
28. Id. at 869.
29. Id. at 828-36 (discussing taxes upon rent); id. at 847-52 (discussing taxes upon
profit); id. at 864-67 (discussing taxes upon wages); id. at 847 (explaining the revenue or
profit arising from stock naturally divides itself into two parts: that which pays the interest,
and which belongs to the owner of the stock; and that surplus part which is over and above
what is necessary for paying the interest).
30. Id. at 847, 869-906 ("Taxes upon Consumable Commodities"). Since most of what
workers earn goes to necessaries, Smith saw direct taxes on both necessaries and wages as
inevitably resulting in either an increase in the cost of labor or a decrease in the availability
of employment. Id. at 874. ("[S]uch heavy taxes upon [necessaries] must increase some-
what the expence of the sober and industrious poor, and must consequently raise more or
less the wages of their labour."); see also id. at 864.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., id. at 203-26 (discussing distributive justice); Haakonssen, supra note 5, at
3 (discussing justice as the foundation of natural jurisprudence); Lieberman, supra note 7,
at 216-21 (discussing natural justice). Smith was at the intersection of three different philo-
sophical trends: (i) the science of jus naturae (natural justice); (ii) the shift in British philos-
ophy from reflection on moral goods to analysis of moral acts; and (iii) the nature-centered
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Smith's theory of natural justice involves human dignity. Smith's under-
standing of necessaries is based on his belief that the material aspects of
human dignity are time and culture specific. 33 Thus in Smith's view, the
size of the tax exemption for necessaries would shift with each society's
fortunes, allowing everyone (including the poor) to enjoy a rising stan-
dard of living.
Smith's depiction of the poor and the working classes is in marked con-
trast to the two prevailing views of his time. One view was based on
traditional notions of social hierarchy, and was reinforced by common
economic theories about labor and motivation. Under that view, poverty
was an eternal and deserved state best left undisturbed. The second view
was based on Christian ethics. It held that the rich had a duty to treat the
poor with kindness and compassion, and to aid them in times of stress.34
Smith rejected both of these traditional notions by disputing that the poor
are inherently inferior or lacking in moral judgment and work ethic.
Rather, Smith asserted that the poor have the same natural talents as the
most exalted, and that their problems arise not from laziness but from
overwork. In fact, given poor and working people's contributions to soci-
ety, it is only equitable that they have access to the goods they produce. 35
Smith's definition of necessaries includes both those things that are
needed for life (for example, heating fuel in the winter) and those things
that ". . . [t]he poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed
to appear in publick without them."'36 What the poorest person needs for
human dignity is highly dependent on historical and cultural conditions. 37
Thus, as countries become richer, their populations should prosper to the
point that everyone, including the poor, experiences rising standards of
living. In order to include the poor and working classes in the universal
prosperity that capitalism promises, a nation must avoid all direct and
indirect taxes on wages and necessaries. 38 For example, the sales taxes
that many American states employ have no place in Smith's ideal tax
system, because taxing necessaries (as opposed to luxuries) is substan-
tially equivalent to taxing wages. Such a scheme then creates a gap be-
tween market and natural price and harms the entire society.39 Further,
religion of deism. Salomon, supra note 8, at 22-23. "Smith standardly combined the nor-
mative goal of natural jurisprudence with the dense explanatory narrative of social and
political history. The critical normative argument served to identify institutionalized fail-
ures of 'natural justice,' whereas the historical material served to illuminate the explana-
tory contexts for these failures." Lieberman, supra note 7, at 228.
33. 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 869-71.
34. FLEISCHACKER, supra note 11, at 203. Universal prosperity is a heartening ideal at
a time when many Americans face declining affluence. Id.
35. "In the context of the eighteenth century, then, Smith presents a remarkably digni-
fied picture of the poor, a picture in which they make choices every bit as respectable as
those of their social superiors-a picture, therefore, in which there really are no 'inferiors'
and 'superiors' at all." Id. at 207.
36. 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 870, 874.
37. Id. at 870.
38. Id. at 870-71.
39. Id. at 871; see also id. at 873 ("Taxes upon luxuries have no tendency to raise the
price of any other commodities except that of the commodities taxed.").
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Smith's aversion to all taxes on wages (whether direct or indirect) argues
against the United States federal income tax and the social security wage
tax, both of which fall heavily on labor.40
A consumption tax with a refundable credit up to the "Living Wage,"
combined with a wealth tax with a large enough exemption to protect the
wealth needed to sustain the "Living Wage" in times of economic stress,
avoids both direct and indirect taxes on wages and necessaries. In addi-
tion, the large exemption transforms a proportional rate into a progres-
sive tax.41 Given Smith's belief that natural justice and human dignity are
dependent on the cultural and political context, the large exemption,
combined with an additional refundable credit in the consumption tax,
could, in the early twenty-first-century United States, support a universal
"Living Wage."'42
2. What Is a "Living Wage"?
There are a number of ways to calculate a minimum material standard
of living threshold. In the contemporary United States there are four
frequently-used ceilings:
* The poverty threshold for a family of four ($20,650); 4 3
* The salary that two adults working full-time at minimum wage earn
after factoring in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the
social security wage tax ($23,848); 4 4
40. The social security system is supported exclusively by taxes on wages. For social
security wage limits, see infra note 158; Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of
Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 910-13 (2005) (discussion of social security).
41. WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION 4-5, 90-100 (1953) ("[A]ny exemption in an otherwise proportionate tax in-
troduces an element of progression in the effective rate.").
42. See infra Part V(A)-(B) on the "Living Wage."
43. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., APPENDIX B: EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT AND FEDERAL POVERTY INFORMATION, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/assetbuilding/
projectbuilder/pdf/AFIGuidebook2006AppB.pdf (last visited May 17, 2008) [hereinafter
APPENDIX B]; see also Gordon M. Fisher, The Development and History of the U.S. Poverty
Thresholds-A Brief Overview, NEWSL. OF THE AM. STAT. ASS'N 6-7 (1997), available at
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/poverty/papers/hptgssiv.htm; Gordon M. Fisher, The Development
and History of the Poverty Thresholds, 55 Soc. SEC. BULL. No. 4, at 3-14 (1992), available
at http://www.ssa.gov/history/fisheronpoverty.html; Gordon M. Fisher, The Development of
the Orshansky Poverty Thresholds and Their Subsequent History as the Official U.S. Pov-
erty Measure (U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Measurement Working Papers, 1997), available
at http://www.census.govfhhes/www/povmeas/papers/orshansky.html. 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2)
defines the term "poverty line" as "[T]he official poverty line defined by the Office of
Management and Budget based on the most recent data available from the Bureau of the
Census." 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2) (2006). See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE EFFECT OF
TAXES AND TRANSFERS ON INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 (2007),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-232.pdf [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU].
44. Calculated as $5.85 per hour x 40 hours a week x 52 weeks a year x 2 workers
$24,336 + $2950 for the EITC minus [$3,438 social security] = $23,848. This is the EITC for
2006, assuming no other outside income or deductions. See IRS, Form 1040 Schedule EIC
(2006); Publication 596: Earned Income Credit (2006). The amount of the social security
tax is taken from one-half of the self-employment tax from Form 1040 SS (self employment
United States income). School breakfasts and lunches, food stamps, bus passes. and subsi-
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* The amount that a married couple, filing a joint return, with two
children can earn before completely losing eligibility for the EITC
($39,783); 45 or
* The projected "Living Wage" for a two-parent family of four
($45,000).46
Each of these four income thresholds for identifying people in need of
government assistance reflect aspects of income, wealth, and race.47 For
example, the median household income for black families is $32,372,
dized housing move the family further from the poverty threshold. See infra note 47 for
programs that use various methods for determining eligibility.
45.
Income Caps for Earned Income Tax Credit, Tax Year 2007
Families With the Family Head Filing Married Filing Jointly
Following Number of Individually
Qualifying Children
0 $12,590 $14,590
1 child $33,241 $35,241
2 or more children $37,783 $39,783
APPENDIX B, supra note 43.
46. When Living Wage advocates try to calculate the income needed to provide hun-
ger security, a decent home, transportation, education, and access to basic news sources
through television, radio, and the internet, the income needed to support a family of four
rises to about $35,000, a number that would change based on family location and other
factors. JEROLD L. WALTMAN, THE CASE FOR THE LIVING WAGE 58 (2004). Amounts that
were included in one calculation of a living wage are listed as food, transportation, health
care, housing, child care, other necessaries, and taxes. Id. at 59 tbl. 4.2. The $35,000 for a
family of four comes close to the median income for a family of four calculated under four
different scenarios, including with government transfer payments based on entitlements
not connected to income. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 43, at 2-3 tbl.1 (showing me-
dian income of households by income definitions (four types of income money income,
market income, post-social insurance income, and disposable income)); see generally OREN
M. LEVIN-WALDMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE LIVING WAGE: A STUDY OF
FOUR CITIES (2005); STEPHANIE LUCE, FIGHTING FOR THE LIVING WAGE (2004); ROBERT
POLLIN & STEPHANIE LUCE, THE LIVING WAGE: BUILDING A FAIR ECONOMY (1998); WIL-
LIAM P. QUIGLEY, ENDING POVERTY AS WE KNOW IT: GUARANTEEING A RIGHT TO A JOB
AT A LIVING WAGE (2003).
47. "The HHS poverty guidelines, or percentage multiples of them (such as 125 per-
cent, 150 percent, or 185 percent), are used as an eligibility criterion by a number of federal
programs, including those listed below. For examples of major means-tested programs that
do not use the poverty guidelines, see the end of this [footnote]."
Department of Health and Human Services:
Community Services Block Grant
Head Start
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)
Community Food and Nutrition Program
PARTS of Medicaid (31 percent of eligibles in Fiscal Year 2004)
Hill-Burton Uncompensated Services Program
AIDS Drug Assistance Program
State Children's Health Insurance Program




Health Professions Student Loans - Loans for Disadvantaged Students
Health Careers Opportunity Program
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which places more than half of black families below both the "Living
Wage" and the EITC income threshold for a two-parent family of four
and above the poverty threshold and the full-time minimum wage for two
workers. 48 On the other hand, whites' median income of $52,375 puts
Scholarships for Health Professions Students from Disadvantaged
Backgrounds
Job Opportunities for Low-Income Individuals
Assets for Independence Demonstration Program
Department of Agriculture:
Food Stamp Program
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Chil-
dren (WIC)
National School Lunch Program (for free and reduced-price meals only)
School Breakfast Program (for free and reduced-price meals only)
Child and Adult Care Food Program (for free and reduced-price meals
only)
Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program
Department of Energy:
Weatherization Assistance for Low-Income Persons
Department of Labor:
Job Corps
National Farm Worker Jobs Program
Senior Community Service Employment Program
Workforce Investment Act Youth Activities
Department of the Treasury:
Low-Income Taxpayer Clinics




Legal Services for the Poor
Most of these programs are non-open-ended programs-that is, programs for which a fixed
amount of money is appropriated each year. The only open-ended or "entitlement" pro-
grams that use the poverty guidelines for eligibility are Food Stamps, the National School
Lunch Program, certain parts of Medicaid, and the subsidized portion of Medicare - Pre-
scription Drug Coverage. Some state and local governments have chosen to use the fed-
eral poverty guidelines in some of their own programs and activities. Examples include
financial guidelines for child support enforcement and determination of legal indigence for
court purposes. Some private companies (such as utilities, telephone companies, and phar-
maceutical companies) and some charitable agencies also use the guidelines in setting eligi-
bility for their services to low-income persons. Major means-tested programs that do not
use the poverty guidelines in determining eligibility include the following:
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and its predecessor,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (in most cases)
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
State/local-funded General Assistance (in most cases)
Large parts of Medicaid (69 percent of [those] eligibl[e] in Fiscal Year
2004)
Section 8 low-income housing assistance
Low-rent public housing"
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONs RELATED TO
THE POVERTY GUIDELINES AND POVERTY, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/faq.shtml#programs
(last visited May 19, 2008) ("What programs use the poverty guidelines?").
48. BRUCE H. WEBSTER JR. & ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
EARNINGS, AND POVERTY DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 3
(2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/acs-08.pdf. The American Com-
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more than half of all white households above all four income measures
(the poverty threshold, minimum wage, EITC and "Living Wage"). 49
According to Smith's view of necessaries as culturally specific, the
$45,000 needed to sustain the "Living Wage" for a two-parent family of
four is best left tax exempt so as to avoid reaching the wages needed to
purchase necessaries. Yet the income needed to sustain the "Living
Wage" (in Smith's parlance-to fund necessaries) is taxed in the United
States at 15.3% for social security wage taxes and Medicare, 18.4 cents on
every gallon for the federal excise tax on gasoline, and up to 7% state-
wide on most purchases, even if no federal income tax is owed.50 Even
with a wide array of transfer payments, most families' cash income is sub-
ject to some combination of state, local, and federal taxes.
3. The "Living Wage" and Wealth
In order to support the "Living Wage," a two-parent family of four
needs more than the $45,000 a year stream of income from labor. The
family also requires a cushion against hard times. Whether due to illness,
a plant closing, or a need to take care of a relative, there are times when
people are forced to drop out of the labor force. When an unanticipated
shock to the income stream occurs, those families with assets are in a
better position to sustain themselves during bad times and to recover as
the economy recovers.5 ' What is the amount of wealth needed to make
that difference? Because housing is such an important part of most
Americans' wealth portfolio, one simple standard to use is the cost of
entry into the housing market. 52 Fannie Mae opines that a family with
$45,000 of annual income can carry a $190,000 house with an 80% mort-
munity Survey collects detailed social, economic, housing, and demographic information
from every county in the country. Id. at 1.
49. Id. at 3. The American Community Survey replaces the Census Bureau long form
for the decennial survey. Id. at 1. For information about sample design, see Am. Cmty.Survey Office, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/ (last visited May 19,
2008).
50. How Much Tax Do We Really Pay?, www.nowandfutures.com/taxes.html (last vis-
ited May 20, 2008). Using a standard deduction and no child care credit, a family of four
earning $45,000 a year would owe $2,178 in federal income taxes. With a child care credit
for two children based on $6,000 of expenses, and each parent having earned income of$22,500, the federal tax liability for 2006 is eliminated. This family is not eligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit because its average income exceeds the income limits for the
EITC. See supra note 45.
51. See infra text and accompanying notes 138-141 (discussing Dalton Conley's con-
struction of two families: one with a house and the other renting an apartment and thedifferences in outcomes because of the differences in their assets). DALTON CONLEY, BE-
ING BLACK LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH & SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 1 (1999).
52. The Fannie Mae website offers a calculator for determining the size of a mortgage
that a family can carry. At $45,000 gross income, and $500 monthly debt, the calculator
allows for $150,000 mortgage at 7% interest. Entry into this home would require a 20%down payment ($38,000) plus closing costs estimated by Fannie Mae at $7,511.18, for a
total of $45,511. Fannie Mae, How Much House Can You Afford?, http://www.mortgage
content.net/scApplication/fanniemae/affordabilityDispatcher.doc (last visited Dec. 29,
2007).
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gage.53 The cost of entry into that housing is approximately $45,500.54
Add six months salary in a cash account for emergencies, and one wealth
exemption amount is $68,000. 55
The average (mean) value of non-Hispanic white households' assets al-
ready far exceeds the minimum wealth needed to sustain the "Living
Wage." In fact, the Non-Hispanic white households' assets average value
of $198,184 is almost three times the minimum amount needed to enter
the housing market on the "Living Wage."'56 In contrast, the average net
worth of black households assets is $35,284, or just over half way towards
the amount needed to enter the housing market at the Living Wage with
comfort. 57 There are similar gaps for female heads of household.
58
D. AN ADDITIONAL CONSUMPTION TAX
In addition to tying taxes to benefits and exempting amounts earned
from labor or needed to sustain a minimum level of subsistence, Smith's
ideal tax system reflects four concerns: (1) tax rates set in proportion to
revenue;59 (2) transparency as to the amount due;60 (3) convenient time
and manner of payment;61 and (4) appropriately constrained costs in rela-
tion to collections. 62 This section explores why Smith's four foundational
tax principles lead to a flat-rate wealth tax, combined with a consumption
tax having a refundable credit up to the "Living Wage."
All taxes need a rate. On the question of an appropriate rate, and
whether that rate is flat, proportional, or progressive, Smith is not a
model of clarity. On the one hand, several of Smith's foundational princi-
ples argue for a flat tax. In fact, Smith's first tax ideal is that the rate
should be in proportion to revenue.63 In addition to clearly violating
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. A $38,000 down payment on a $190,000 home plus $7,511 in closing costs, plus six
months' salary of $22,500 equals $68,011. See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 3, at 58-
59 (arguing that every American child should be endowed with $80,000).
56. Hous. & HOUSEHOLD ECON. STATISTICS Div., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ASSET
OWNERSHIP OF HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/wealth/1998_ 2000/
wlthOO-5.html (2005).
57. Id.
58. For example, the median income estimate for a female head of household in 2006
is $31,818, which is lower than the amount needed to qualify for an earned income tax
credit with even one child. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006 5 tbl.1
(showing the Income and Earnings Summary Measures by Selected Characteristics: 2005
and 2006) (2007), http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-2 33 .pdf. The median income
for a married couple was estimated for 2006 at $69,716 and for a male head of household at
$47,078. Id.
59. 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 825.
60. The amount due "ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every
other person." Id. at 825-26.
61. Id. at 826.
62. Id.
63. Proportional taxation is "a tax which takes the same proportion of each taxpayer's
income, often called a 'flat tax."' RICHARD A. WESTIN, WG&L TAX DICTIONARY 559
(2000). A proportional tax is based on a single rate (usually combined with one exemp-
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Smith's first ideal of proportional taxation, progressive tax rates compli-
cate the Code beyond measure. 64 Tax complexity violates Smith's second
tax ideal (transparency), which, for Smith, requires that the amount owed
"ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other
person. '65 This sort of transparency is difficult for complicated tax sys-
tems to achieve. 66 Progressive rates also violate Smith's fourth admoni-
tion to constrain the cost of tax administration.6 7
Nevertheless, although three of Smith's four tax ideals seem to support
proportional taxation, Smith was not the model of consistency in his se-
lection of rates. In fact, Smith moved between proportional and progres-
sive taxation with ease. Smith began his discussion of tax rates with a
hard stand for proportional rates: "The subjects of every state ought to
contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible,
in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the rev-
enue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state."'68
Then, throughout the rest of Book V, Smith quickly undercut his strong
proportional tax position with a series of equally strong progressive tax
exceptions. 6 9
tion) so that, although there is a mild progressive feature to the proportional tax, the rate
only rises once at the end of the exemption. See generally Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling
Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 157 (1999).
64. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 41, at 14-15 ("The first consideration is the price
paid for progression in terms of complicating the structure of the income tax, expanding
the opportunity for taxpayer ingenuity directed to lawfully avoiding taxes, creating very
difficult questions of equity among taxpayers, and obscuring the implications of any given
provision in the tax law."); see also Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury
It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 269-73 (1983) (explaining that the estate tax is a small net contributor
to progressive taxation); Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much
Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 151 (1997).
65. 2 WEALTH OF NAnONS supra note 7, at 825.
66. To illustrate: if gasoline is subject to a one dollar excise tax, then each gallon pur-
chased will carry with it one dollar in tax, and everyone buying or selling gasoline will
know this cost across transactions. A transparent gasoline excise tax imparts a high level of
general knowledge at the cost of an easy computation. In contrast, how many taxpayers
under our present progressive income tax understand their own tax affairs even after
spending considerable time and expense on compliance? Consider further the information
that the complex process of tax calculation masks. For example, consider how capital gains
undercuts horizontal and vertical equity. See, e.g., Haskell Wald, 65 ETHics 68, 68 (1954)(book review) (criticizing BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 41, for not discussing how the
capital gains tax undercuts progressive rates); see generally Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden
Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919 (1997).
67. The cost of administration should be modest. "[T]axes are frequently so much
more burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign." 2 WEALTH OF
NATIONS, supra note 7, at 826.
68. Id. at 825.
69. For example, Smith stated that: "[a] tax upon house-rents, therefore, would in gen-
eral fall heaviest upon the rich: and in this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be
any thing very unreasonable. It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to
the publick expence, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in
that proportion." Id. at 842. In fact, Smith even approved of taxes on rents that are
slightly higher for noblemen, and lower for those without titles while he strongly disap-
proves of land taxes that exempt noblemen's holdings. Id. at 835. Smith believed that a
road tax based on weight is an ideal tax, because the tax due is based on the weight of the
vehicle using the road, so that the cost of the benefit is matched to the beneficiary. Id. at
724. Nevertheless, Smith still allows that "[w]hen the toll upon carriages of luxury, upon
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Why was Smith so open to the rich paying higher taxes in the face of
his first principle-taxes in proportion to revenues? Perhaps Smith's fear
was that eighteenth-century British taxes inaccurately matched govern-
ment cost to benefit. Recall that Smith's ideals argue for taxing posses-
sions, that was to say wealth, but those ideals were forced to operate
within an administrative structure that is generally better at taxing com-
modities than possessions, leading the eighteenth-century British to rely
heavily on customs, stamp, and excise taxes. Customs, stamp, and excise
taxes are all regressive taxes that, according to Smith, become even more
regressive as their ultimate costs are borne by working people and con-
sumers.70 In order to balance the regressive nature of consumption taxes,
Smith introduced progressive tax rates so that those who benefit most
from government pay as much as those who benefit less. In a compre-
hensive wealth tax, this accommodation of higher rates in exchange for a
less reliable base becomes less important, particularly when balanced
against Smith's other tax ideals. However, a consumption tax still has a
role in Smith's capitalist tax system.
Smith was not a friend of the rich or of conspicuous consumption.71 For
example, although Smith opposed all taxes on necessaries, he was more
than comfortable with luxury taxes. 72 With modern tax administration, a
consumption tax with a large exemption amount and a refundable credit
becomes a luxury tax. The combined wealth and consumption tax equal-
izes liability between savings and consumption while avoiding the need to
differentiate between necessaries and luxuries. The amount needed to
support a family at the "Living Wage" is exempted from taxation
(thereby protecting the consumption of necessaries), while consumption
over the "Living Wage" amount is subject to what amounts to a mildly
progressive luxury tax. Smith sought to punish excessive consumption
with mildly progressive rates, suggesting that Smith would endorse a con-
sumption tax on expenditures over the "Living Wage" as part of an ideal
tax system. 7
3
coaches, post-chaises, &c. is made somewhat higher in proportion to their weight, than
upon carriages of necessary use, such as carts, wagons, &c. the indolence and vanity of the
rich is made to contribute in a very easy manner to the relief of the poor, by rendering
cheaper the transportation of heavy goods to all the different parts of the country." Id. at
725.
70. For a discussion of progressive and regressive rates with various examples, see
ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY app. (2001).
71. "A man of a large revenue ... thinks he ought to live like other men of large
revenues; and to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissipation." 2
WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 813-14.
72. Id. at 873.
73. "It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the publick expence,
not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion." Id.
at 842.
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III. HOW DID THE UNITED STATES COME TO ADOPT AN
INCOME TAX?
Smith teaches us that all tax systems are a product of the administra-
tive, political, cultural and social constraints of their time and place.74
Our present hybrid income/consumption tax is no exception. As demon-
strated below, the present United States tax system was born from con-
cerns that are now both distant and obsolete. These concerns include lack
of administrative capacity, the fear that Congress would use the tax sys-
tem to destroy slavery, and general cultural notions of fairness and pri-
vacy that might lead to insurrection if violated.
A. AMERICAN COLONIES
British taxation in the American colonies illustrated how successful tax
systems must work in tandem with politics, culture, and administrative
capacity. In terms of administrative capacity, taxation in the American
colonies mirrored taxation in the British motherland. At home, the Brit-
ish government faced two challenges: political constraints that forced it to
raise revenues from taxes (as opposed to, for example, the sale of natural
resources or plunder from war) and such a lack of administrative capacity
that privateers and local counties collected taxes on behalf of the central
government. 75 Britain's limited administrative capacity could not sustain
a comprehensive tax of any type, either at home or abroad.7 6 Instead of
74. One need only look to the many comparisons between nations that Smith em-
ployed in his discussion of taxation in Book V of the Wealth of Nations to understand how
important culture and politics are in Smith's understanding of taxation. For example, Smith
opined that tax systems should be structured to protect privacy interests so that, in con-
structing a land tax, Smith preferred to use the number of windows as a proxy for value
rather than the number of hearths because windows are visible from the street while hearth
taxes require the collector to enter the taxpayer's home. Id. at 845-46. Another violation of
privacy that Smith identified is a tax that requires a merchant to open his books, because
public knowledge of the merchant's finances might expose the taxpayer to public shame.
Id. at 848. "[B]y subjecting the people to the frequent visits, and the odious examination of
the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppres-
sion; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent to the
expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it." Id. at 827. On
the other hand, Smith believed that land values are public and well known and so Smith
has no objection to a land-based wealth tax. LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 25,
at 531; 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 848. These examples show Smith's sensitiv-
ity to political and cultural constraints in his evaluation of tax systems and his interpreta-
tion of his own culture and its notions of privacy in fiscal matters. For more contemporary
discussions of the importance of politics and culture in taxation, see generally Kornhauser,
supra note 3; Beverly I. Moran, Income Tax Rhetoric (or Why Do We Want Tax Reform?),
1992 Wis. L. REV. 2063; Beverly I. Moran, Setting an Agenda for the Study of Tax and
Black Culture, 21 U. ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L. REv. 779 (1999).
75. JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE
1688-1783 91-95 (1990). Later, as the central government's capacity increased, collection
moved from private tax farming to state collection agencies. Id.
76. A comprehensive tax tries to identify and tax everything within its defined tax
base. A specific tax targets a subset of a larger tax base. For example, a comprehensive
wealth tax tries to tax wealth in all of its forms. A specific land tax taxes wealth in the form
of land. See 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 825 (a comprehensive tax reaches all
sources of private revenue of individuals including rents, profits, and wages); id. (specific
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using a comprehensive tax base, the British relied on specialized taxes on
readily identifiable targets, such as wealth taxes on land and commodities
taxes on goods. 77
Britain's lack of administrative capacity followed it to the American
colonies. Considered in a vacuum removed from social, cultural, and po-
litical constraints, a stamp tax on imported goods was a good solution to
Britain's need to raise revenues.78 However, as the British discovered, no
tax is exempt from social, cultural, and political concerns. Thus, the
Stamp Act of 1765 so conflicted with the politics and culture of the Amer-
ican colonies that the Boston Tea Party helped fuel a rebellion and estab-
lish the United States. 79
taxes are unequal because they fall on only one of the three types of private revenue of
individuals).
77. In addition to being on the verge of industrialization, eighteenth-century Britain
was an expanding military power supported by an aggressive system of public finance
based on a combination of taxes and debt. Although throughout most of human history
governments raised revenues without using either debt or taxes (as, for example, through
the sale of natural resources or by conquest through war), the political realities of eight-
eenth-century Britain limited that government's revenue raising options. In fact, the ag-
gressive revenue policy needed to fund military expansion, combined with the political
need to raise revenues through taxes or debt, meant that early eighteenth-century British
taxes were significantly higher than taxes in other European countries. Britain commonly
raised these taxes as stamp, customs, excise, and land taxes. Although the century ended
with the excise tax raising forty percent of Britain's revenues, the land tax was preeminent
in the early 1700s and continued to play a significant role throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury. The eighteenth-century British shift from land taxes to excise taxes reflected changes
in the nation's administrative and political capacities. One reason that the land tax re-
mained robust throughout the century was that it represented the power of the Parliament
and local government over the central executive. This emphasis on legislative and local
control was built into the British laws governing land taxes (which required that Parlia-
ment set both the tax and the rate each year) and in the administrative structure of land tax
collection (which was housed in local county boards). In contrast, the excise and customs
taxes required more sophisticated administrative collection systems. See BREWER, supra
note 75, at 89-114; see also Musgrave, supra note 25, at 296-319; THOROLD ROGERS, THE
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 461-64 (1889); Rothschild & Sen, supra note 10,
at 354.
78. The Stamp Act of 1765 taxed goods that came into the colonies by ship, because
one of the few parts of the colonies that the British controlled completely were ports and
large public markets. For background discussion of the importance of the port of New
York City to the British government in the colonial period, see HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN
AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 25 (G. Edward White ed., 1983). The fact that the merchan-
dise was inspected and stamped before unloading meant that the subject of the tax could
be held in a confined and easily controlled space, thus reducing the need for large numbers
of revenue agents. The stamp on the packaged tea proclaimed that the goods were prop-
erly taxed as they traveled through interior markets, thereby further reducing enforcement
costs. See BREWER, supra note 75, at 176 (discussing the difficulty the British had in effec-
tively taxing its American colonies). See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M.
MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS (1953); P.D.G. THOMAS, BRITISH POLITICS AND THE
STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO A REVOLUTION (1975). For a discussion of political
reactions in the American colonies to the Stamp Act of 1765, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 24-44 (2002).
79. See generally RICHARD D. BROWN, THE REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS IN MASSA-
CHUSET-rS (1970). See also EVARTS B. GREENE, REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 1763-1790
198-230 (1943); WOOD, supra note 78, at 38-44.
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B. EARLY UNITED STATES
Another illustration of the importance of politics and culture to taxa-
tion comes from early American history when the new Congress con-
fronted the same administrative, cultural, and political challenges that the
British faced during the colonial period. In terms of administrative capac-
ity, Congress (like Britain before it) was challenged by a complicated se-
ries of local governments with multiple currencies and porous borders.80
In addition, the central government's scarce administrative capacity
meant that the early United States Congress was limited to enacting spe-
cific, rather than comprehensive, taxes.
In terms of politics, Congress dealt with the same anti-tax population
that caused Britain to lose its American colonies. Unlike the British colo-
nial experience where the colonists had no political voice, the new coun-
try's anti-tax bias was expressed in its Constitution, which severely
limited Congress's ability to lay direct taxes. 81 As a result of the constitu-
tional restriction on direct taxes, British-style land taxes were not availa-
ble to the United States. 82
Without regard to cultural ideals of fairness, Congress' poor adminis-
trative capacity and the constitutional limits on its ability to lay direct
taxes made a presumptive tax on alcohol production attractive.83 Like the
80. See Joseph Ernst, "Ideology" and an Economic Interpretation of the Revolution, in
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 159-85 (Alfred F. Young ed., 1976); GREENE, supra note 79,
at 337-56; Gary J. Kornblith & John M. Murrin, The Making and Unmaking of an Ameri-
can Ruling Class, in BEYOND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 50-54 (Alfred F. Young ed.,
1993).
81. The eighteenth-century United States Constitution gave Congress a limited power
to tax. For example, the Apportionment Clause prohibits direct taxes unless apportioned
by population. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. In the early United States economy, the signifi-
cant distinction between a direct tax (which Congress was prohibited from enacting with-
out apportionment) and an indirect tax was that a direct tax reached non-market
transactions while an indirect tax only reached market transactions. In other words, be-
cause an indirect tax requires a transaction, a person who does not engage in transactions
(for example a farmer who produces all his own food and other necessities) is essentially
completely exempt from tax. See NationsBank of Texas, N.A. v. United States, 269 F.3d
1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Tax is "direct tax," within meaning of Apportionment Clause,
"if levied directly upon property ... it is not direct if levied on the transfer of property
from one person to another."); Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 1955)
(stating that direct taxes "bear directly upon persons, upon their possession and enjoyment
of rights, whereas indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an event such as an
exchange or transmission of property"). See generally Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558-64 (1895), overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505
(1988); see also discussion infra note 87.
82. A tax on land value-a tax laid in almost every county in the United States and a
significant part of eighteenth-century British taxation-is a direct wealth tax. A land tax is
also a specific tax because it is laid on only one type of wealth. In contrast, a comprehen-
sive wealth tax reaches all forms of wealth. For a general discussion of real property taxes
in the United States, see generally NIKOLAI MIKHAILOV & JASON KOLMAN, TYPES OF
PROPERTY TAX AND ASSESSMENT LIMITATIONS AND TAX RELIEF PROGRAMS (1998), avail-
able at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/valuationtaxation/dl/mikhailov.pdf; CLAR-
ENCE Y.H. Lo, SMALL PROPERTY VERSUS BIG GOVERNMENT: SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE
PROPERTY TAX REVOLT (1990).
83. As the first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton supported the excise
tax on distilled spirits as part of the Excise Tax of 1791. See Excise Act of March 3, 1791,
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Stamp Act of 1765, which allowed the British to target a small area (that
is, ports large enough to hold ocean-going ships) the Whiskey Tax al-
lowed Congress to target readily identifiable points of production, such as
whiskey producing stills. Making the tax even easier to administer was its
presumptive rate, which calculated the amount owed based on the pre-
sumption that each still would: (1) produce at full capacity; (2) offer all its
alcohol for sale (as opposed to personal use); and (3) sell for the same
price throughout the nation. 84
Unfortunately for the young republic, no matter how suited to Con-
gress' constitutional and administrative constraints, the Whiskey Tax so
violated the early American sense of fairness that it almost destroyed the
nation.85 The Whiskey Rebellion demonstrated once more that successful
taxes must fit political and cultural expectations, as well as administrative
capacity. 86
ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199, 199-214. The Act is officially titled "An Act repealing, after the last day
of June next, the duties heretofore laid upon Distilled Spirits imported from abroad, and
laying others in their stead; and also upon Spirits distilled within the United States, and for
appropriating the same." Id.
84. The presumptive tax rate was based on a sales price that was higher than the pre-
vailing price for alcohol in the Western territories, but lower than the sales prices received
in the Eastern states. See EINHORN, supra note 70, at 188-99; WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE
WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE WASHINGTON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRON-
TIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA'S NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY 60-70 (2006);
THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION 143-57 (1986). The higher Western market presumptive sales rate in-
flamed regional tensions by taxing Westerners at a higher rate than Easterners. For
example, if Abraham owned a still in the Western territory of Pennsylvania with the capac-
ity to produce 100 gallons, Abraham was taxed as though he sold 100 gallons for a statuto-
rily defined price (for example $2.50 a gallon or $250 in total). Because the rate was based
on a presumption rather than on actual sales, Abraham was taxed on this $250 even if he
kept 20 gallons for personal use and even if the sales price for alcohol in the Western
territory was only $2 a gallon instead of $2.50. On theother hand, if James owned a still in
Vermont which could also produce 100 gallons, then James would be taxed on the same
$250 as Abraham even though alcohol might sell for $4 a gallon in Vermont and James
might sell his entire 100 gallons. The presumptive tax rate was a good fit for the eighteenth-
century United States government's capacity because the tax calculation required little
manpower. All that was needed was an annual visit from a revenue agent who ascertained
a still's capacity and calculated the tax based on the presumption that the still would pro-
duce at full capacity and sell at a presumed price.
85. Although well suited to the eighteenth-century government's capacity, the pre-
sumptive tax offended eighteenth-century American cultural and political sensitivities as
reflected in constitutional restrictions on the central government's power to tax contained
in the Apportionment Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. By not distinguishing between
personal consumption and commerce, the alcohol production tax reached people that the
eighteenth-century U.S. Constitution meant to exempt when it limited Congress's ability to
lay direct taxes. The reaction against the tax became violent in 1794 when Pennsylvania
farmers protested the excise tax on distilled spirits by "waving banners denouncing tyranny
and proclaiming, 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."' W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL
TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 23 (2d ed. 2004). George Washington was
forced to send 15,000 troops into Western Pennsylvania to quell the Whiskey Rebellion.
Id.; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Pro-
tests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 842-48 (2002).
86. See JACOB EARNEST COOKE, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 146-48 (1982).
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C. EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Congress' ability
to tax was limited by the Apportionment Clause, which made direct taxes
almost impossible. 87 The American antipathy to taxation continued in
this period, fueled by slaveholding elites who protected their property
from the non-slaveholding majority by developing and circulating a ver-
sion of United States history that claimed federal taxation was anti-demo-
cratic. 88 Taxes during this period were on slaves, whiskey, and other
commodities. 89 These taxes were both indirect and specific. Neither di-
rect taxes nor comprehensive tax systems occurred on the federal level
until the early twentieth century. The first hundred years of United
States public finance were centered on great public land sales and trans-
fers. 90 During its first century, the United States, like many developing
87. The Apportionment Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, served a number of dif-
ferent purposes. One purpose, discussed supra note 81, was to prohibit the federal govern-
ment from taxing people not engaged in commerce. Another reason for the
apportionment requirement was that it protected the wealthy land and slave-holding politi-
cal minority from the non-slave-holding political majority. Because representatives are
assigned to each state based on population, states with large populations could exercise
control over wealthy land and slave holding minorities who lived in states with small white
male populations. One way to shift the balance of power was contained in Article 1, sec-
tion 2, clause 3's Apportionment Clause, which prevented direct taxes on land and slaves.
Another protection for the slaveholding minority was the rule also contained in the Appor-
tionment Clause, counting slaves in the number of people needed to acquire a representa-
tive (the so called three-fifths rule). See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796)
(discussing direct taxation); EINHORN, supra note 70, at 138-45 (discussing the three-fifths
rule); Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-13 (1999);
Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of 'Direct Taxes': Are Consumption Taxes Unconstitu-
tional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2337, 2339-2442 (1997); Calvin H. Johnson, Apportion-
ment of Direct Taxes: The Foul Up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 1, 5-8, 12-13, 46-57 (1998); Barry Matsumoto, Commentary: One and (An) Other, 1
J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253, 253 (1997).
88. In American Taxation, American Slavery, Professor Einhorn describes how large
Southern planters created a rhetoric that made taxation itself seem anti-democratic. This
rhetoric was created in order to protect their land and slaveholding interests from the non-
slave holding majority. EINHORN, supra note 70, at 201-27. For a more contemporary
description of how another wealthy class shaped public opinion in order to protect itself
from taxation, see Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the Law in the
1930s: How a 'Common Man' Campaign Ended a Rich Man's Law, available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=880383 (Tulane Public Law Research Paper No.
06-02). Professor Kornhauser describes how the wealthy created a public relations cam-
paign against a proposed amendment to the Internal Revenue Code that would have re-
quired public disclosure of assets. Id. According to Professor Kornhauser, the public
relations campaign succeeded in the same way described by Professor Einhorn-by again
making taxes seem anti-democratic and the disclosure rule a threat to the entire population
when, in fact, the disclosure rule only threatened the limited economic interests of the
wealthiest taxpayers.
89. Before the Civil War, taxes were primarily raised by tariffs and taxes on the sale of
whiskey, land, carriages, and slaves. EINHORN, supra note 70, at 117-56. After the Civil
War, excise taxes on tobacco, beer, and whiskey; tariffs on imported goods, and sales of
natural resources paid for governmental expenses. BROWNLEE, supra note 85, at 13-57;
RANDOLPH PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1-29 (1954).
90. For a discussion of federal land grants, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND
AMERICAN LAW 43-69 (2001); see generally LLOYD J. MERCER, RAILROADS AND LAND
GRANT POLICY (1982). For a discussion of the limited use of income taxes in developing
countries, see Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited
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countries, took most of its revenues from non-tax sources. 91
D. TWENTIETH CENTURY INCOME TAX-BEFORE WORLD WAR II
By the time World War I became an important part of the federal
budget, there were fewer natural resources to sell, the South had lost the
fight over slavery, a national economy was emerging from a previously
more regional configuration, and the federal government was beginning
to build capacity across a broader range of activities. The prevailing wis-
dom was that government should avoid creating market distortions. The
decline in rural wealth from the eighteenth to the twentieth century gave
less force to feared threats to the agrarian ideal, and an identifiable (al-
beit small) class of individuals and companies emerged from the Civil
War with significant annual income. 92 These factors taken together
meant that by the beginning of the twentieth century, the federal govern-
ment was equipped to administer a small-scale comprehensive income tax
and so, in 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment lifted the constitutional re-
striction on Congress' ability to lay direct taxes on income. 93 The result-
Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1628-95
(2005).
91. The public finance measures employed by the United States resemble public fi-
nance measures of resource rich developing countries today. For example, consider pre-
sent day Russia and its sales of oil. See generally WORLD BANK, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC
REPORT #14 (2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRUSSIAFEDER-
ATION/Resources/RER14_eng-full.pdf; Andrew Kramer, A New Problem for Russia:
How to Spend all that Oil Money, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 15, 2005, Finance, at 17.
92. Specific taxes tend to be easier to administer than comprehensive taxes because
the state can target those items that are easiest to identify and value. Because specific
taxes only target limited types of economic activity, specific taxes are said to have a dis-
torting effect on economic relations as people move away from activities that are taxed in
order to invest in activities that are not taxed. Smith acknowledges this problem in the
Wealth of Nations. 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 825. Thus, one reason in favor
of a comprehensive tax base is that comprehensive taxes avoid targeting one set of eco-
nomic relationships over another by treating every item in the tax base equally.
93. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 states, "[D]irect Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States ... according to their respective Numbers ... " The meaning of this constitu-
tional prohibition is that when the federal government is involved in laying direct taxes,
such as taxes on wealth or income, the revenues raised must be apportioned by population
state by state. The income tax is a direct tax and is therefore unconstitutional under this
provision. The income tax was made constitutional by the 16th Amendment which states
that: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also supra note 81 (citing judicial
decisions regarding the constitutionality of direct taxes without apportionment). For a dis-
cussion of the intellectual foundations of the income tax, see generally, e.g., JOHN F.
WrrrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1985); RICH-
ARD J. JOSEPH, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN INCOME TAX 1-29 (2004) (purpose of the
income tax was to redistribute tax burden not wealth); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Un-
derstanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 812 (2005) (income tax was meant to reach
capital in addition to wages); see generally Ajay Mehrotra, Edwin R. A. Seligman and the
Beginnings of the U.S. Income Tax, 109 TAX NOTES 933 (Nov. 14, 2005); Ajay K. Mehrotra,
Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intel-
lectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005). For a discus-
sion of the income tax's shift from a small tax on the wealthy to a large tax on the entire
population, see Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the
Expansion of the Income Tax during World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 685-88 (1989),
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ing income tax purported to be comprehensive and universal, but actually
required only about two percent of the population to participate.94
E. TWENTIETH CENTURY INCOME TAX-WORLD WAR II
AND BEYOND
The income tax remained small until World War II. Its expansion was
made possible by the earlier creation of the Social Security old-age pen-
sion system which allowed the government to identify income from
wages. 95 Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, the income tax
grew to reach most of the population, but it did not reach all income, at
least not with equal force. 96 In the hybrid income/consumption tax sys-
tem used today, property values often escape taxation for long periods,
and sometimes altogether. 97
and Beverly I. Moran, Welcome to the Funhouse: The Incredible Maze of Divorce Taxation,
26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 117, 122-26 (1989) (discussing the explosion in income taxation as a
result of World War II).
94. BROWNLEE, supra note 85, at 57. See also Ackerman, supra note 87 (income tax
was made politically possible by the concentration of income in the North-Eastern States).
95. 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 (2000). The Social Security Act was enacted in 1935 under the
New Deal programs of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. JOHN MAJOR, THE NEW
DEAL 91 (1968); see generally MARY POOLE, THE SEGREGATED ORIGINS OF SOCIAL SE-
CURITY: AFRICAN AMERICAN AND THE WELFARE STATE (2006); BASIL RAUCH, THE His-
TORY OF THE NEW DEAL 1933-1938 (1944); Beverly I. Moran, Income Tax Rhetoric (or
Why Do We Want Tax Reform?), 1992 Wis. L. REV. 2063 (discussing social security as a
precursor to expanding the income tax).
96. The way that the income tax was (and is) structured favors property ownership
over wage labor by providing lower rates and deferred taxation for most property owner-
ship while requiring yearly taxation at higher rates for earned income. Beverly I. Moran &
William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 751,
759-69 (discussing the aspects of the income tax that favor property over earned income).
The statutory exemption from tax for unrealized gains contained in the Internal Revenue
Code differs from the definition of income offered by Henry Simons in his book Personal
Income Taxation: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In other words, it
is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the period to "wealth" at the
end of the period and then subtracting "wealth" at the beginning." HENRY C. SIMON,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). Although the original Tariff of 1913, the prede-
cessor to the Internal Revenue Code, taxed income from savings, over the twentieth cen-
tury the Internal Revenue Code moved to a hybrid income/consumption tax model with
such consumption tax features as protection for retirement savings, I.R.C. §§ 401-420; col-
lege savings, I.R.C. §§ 529-530; medical savings, I.R.C. §§ 105-106 (2000). See also Wil-
liam D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1113, 1128 (1974); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy under a Hybrid Income-Con-
sumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1146-73 (1992); see generally Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Flow Through Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 931 (1975).
97. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2000) (mortgage interest deduction); I.R.C. § 121 (2000)
(exclusion of gains on the sale of a principle residence); I.R.C. § 102 (2000) (exclusion for
bequests and gifts); Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 560 (1991); see generally
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see also Mary Louis Fellows, A Comprehensive
Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1990) (discussing the deferral of taxation on
unrealized gains in stock).
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F. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TAX?
The history of taxation in the United States, from the colonial period to
the present, illustrates that every United States tax system reflected the
political and cultural ideals of its time. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the ideal of self-sufficient agrarian production over commercial
trading protected large land and slaveholding elites by prohibiting direct
taxes without apportionment.98 In the twentieth century, reduced access
to non-tax revenue, combined with increased need for funds brought
about by two world wars, the improved government capacity to track
wages by social security numbers, and the belief that comprehensive taxes
are less harmful to market transactions, led to a comprehensive income
tax.99 At the beginning of the twenty-first-century, the United States uses
income as its tax base as much for twentieth century administrative con-
venience and eighteenth-century needs to protect slavery as because an
income tax base represents some ideal. If every tax is a function of its
place and time, then it is appropriate to ask how the United States Con-
gress would construct a tax today if it were writing on a clean slate.
IV. ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES CONTEXT
A comprehensive wealth tax added to a consumption tax that provides
a refundable credit up to the "Living Wage" meets Smith's basic beliefs
about an ideal tax system, that is, tying benefits to beneficiaries. Another
Smith ideal is transparency. A flat tax rate meets Smith's call for trans-
parency, because flat rates are easier for the general public to calculate
and harder to distort through hidden benefits. A large exemption allows
the consumption tax to exempt the wages used to purchase necessaries,
effectively becoming a progressive tax that, when combined with a wealth
tax, addresses some of the societal ills currently under discussion in the
United States. These ills include the conflict between affirmative action
for social class or for race, reparations, and the "Living Wage." What
then are some of the specific conditions in the United States that might
stand in the way of a comprehensive wealth tax?
A. BENEFIT THEORY REVISITED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
WELFARE STATE
Benefit theory ties tax costs to government benefits. What defines gov-
ernment benefits, and who receives such benefits, is not static. For exam-
ple, as opposed to the early twenty-first century United States,
eighteenth-century Britain employed virtually no transfer payments.
Thus:
Smith never faced the problem which was to cause such intellectual
agony for later generations-of whether the government is weaken-
ing or strengthening the market mechanism when it steps in with
98. See supra part 111(C).
99. See supra parts 111(D) & (E).
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welfare legislation. Aside from poor relief, there was virtually no
welfare legislation in Smith's day-the government was the un-
abashed ally of the governing classes and the great tussle within the
government was whether it should be the landowning or the indus-
trial classes who should most benefit. The question of whether the
working class should have a voice in the direction of economic affairs
simply did not enter any respectable person's mind.100
Given that Smith operated in a very different world, it is fair to ask
whether the primary government benefit Smith identified in eighteenth-
century Britain, i.e. wealth, is the same government benefit enjoyed to-
day. Do the poor get more from government in a welfare state than the
rich?
In answering the question of whether government benefits are no
longer limited to the creation, preservation, and protection of property,
consider that Smith tied government and wealth together in ways that
modern-day benefit theorists on either side of the spectrum might dis-
pute. For example, although Smith conceded that public education bene-
fits the working classes by providing escape from dull lives of repetition
brought on by the division of labor, for Smith the real benefit of public
education goes to the wealthy, who receive a prophylactic against revolu-
tion.101 Thus, Smith saw free universal public education and other trans-
fer payments as government benefits to the rich. Imagine what life would
be like for middle-class Americans if their cities were filled with the sort
of aggressive beggars and thieves that Dickens portrays, and then ask
who benefits from government transfer payments.
10 2
B. DIFFERENT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES AND CAPACITIES
In comparing Adam Smith's tax ideals to the twenty-first century
United States, it is important to acknowledge that Smith was not writing
about an income tax. The Wealth of Nations was first published in 1776,
100. HEILBRONER, supra note 8, at 70.
101. Smith expressed his view on the benefits education confers on the working class:
"The state ... derives no inconsiderable advantage from ... instruction [of the working
classes]. The more they are instructed the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm
and superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful
disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and or-
derly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each individually, more re-
spectable and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and they are
therefore more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to examine,
and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of faction and sedition, and
they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposi-
tion to the measures of government. In free countries, where the safety of government
depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the people may form of its con-
duct, it must surely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge
rashly or capriciously concerning it." 2 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 781-82, 788.
102. See generally DANIEL BORN, THE BIRTH OF LIBERAL GUILT IN THE ENGLISH
NOVEL: CHARLES DICKENS TO H.G. WELLS (1995); PAUL A. JARVIE, READY TO TRAMPLE
ON ALL HUMAN LAW: FINANCIAL CAPITALISM IN THE FICTION OF CHARLES DICKENS
(2005); GRACE MOORE, DICKENS AND EMPIRE: DISCOURSES OF CLASS, RACE AND
COLONIALISM IN THE WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS (2004).
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and Britain did not see its first income tax until 1799.103 In fact, Smith
specifically condemned certain aspects of an income tax, for example, a
direct tax on wages.104
The fact that the United States has a robust income tax that reaches a
large majority of the population is a testament to the advanced state of
this country's bureaucracy over eighteenth-century Britain. Nevertheless,
although eighteenth-century Britain cannot compare with the govern-
mental infrastructure and technology available today, it did manage to
raise a remarkable amount of tax revenue.10 5 In fact, eighteenth-century
Britain raised more taxes than its contemporaries and more than some of
today's developing countries as well. 10 6 Thus, although Smith could not
have imagined the administrative structures that support the present day
federal tax system, he did have something to say about the cost of tax
administration in relationship to an ideal tax system.
In the present day context, Smith might opine that the United States
tax system's greatest administrative strength-its ability to reach out and
touch the entire population-is also its greatest flaw. In terms of match-
ing the administrative cost of collection to the revenues generated-
Smith's fourth tax ideal-the great cost of keeping low income taxpayers
in the system, rather than focusing on enforcement among the wealthy, is
nonsensical. 10 7 In contrast, a flat-rate comprehensive wealth tax with a
large exemption, augmenting a consumption tax with a refundable credit
up to the "Living Wage," would exempt a large portion of the population
from federal taxation, with the remaining taxpayers having enough
wealth to invest in the sort of compliance activities that are essential to a
well-run tax system.10 8 The resulting administrative agency would shift
103. Rothschild & Sen, supra note 10, at 354. The British income tax was progressive
from its inception until today.
104. "The middling and superior ranks of people, if they understood their own interest,
ought always to oppose all taxes upon the necessaries of life, as well as all direct taxes upon
the wages of labour." WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 7, at 873.
105. BREWER, supra note 75, at 88.
106. Id. at 89; see also 6 NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, THE RISE OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND RUSSIA 1688-1715 285 (J. S. Bromley ed., 1971); see generally Rothchild &
Sen, supra note 10.
107. In fact, because of a congressional mandate, a significant amount of audits are
targeted at the poorest Americans. See generally, e.g., Leslie Book, EITC Noncompliance:
What We Don't Know Can Hurt Them, 99 TAX NOTES 1821 (June 23, 2003).
108. See MEIZHU Lul ET AL., THE COLOR OF WEALTH: THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S.
RACIAL WEALTH DIVIDE 75 (2006) (discussing the factors in American history that have
created the large wealth gap between whites and people of color who live in America).
"The racial wealth gap has widened, according to the Federal Reserve Bank's most recent
Survey of Consumer Finances, which found that African Americans were 13 percent of the
U.S. population in 2001, but owned only 3 percent of the country's assets." Id. "Data
examined to determine median net worth-that number at which half the population is
above and half below-show that in 1989 whites had a median net worth of $97,800, and
blacks, $5,300. A little over a decade later in 2001, whites had a median net worth over
$120,000, while that of blacks was under $20,000. While both levels had increased, given
the sorrowfully low overall level for African Americans, too little changed." Id. "Mean
net worth-the average calculated by adding everyone's wealth together and dividing by
the number of households-is even more unequal. African Americans' average of $75,748
in 2001 is only one-sixth of whites' average of $482,534. For every dollar the average white
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from an emphasis on outreach to a greater involvement in monitoring
and regulating complicated transactions. Although the total administra-
tive cost might remain the same, the potential return would increase,
while federal taxation would disappear for a significant portion of the
population. 0 9
C. DIFFERENCES IN TAX BURDENS
Although eighteenth-century Britain raised as much revenues as some
twenty-first century developing countries, Smith had no experience of the
tax burden imposed by the United States or contemporary European na-
tions. What Smith saw was a government that could not sustain any sort
of comprehensive tax system and was reduced instead to targeting spe-
cific commodities and land. In contrast, the United States has already
demonstrated the capacity to reach all sorts of income at home and
abroad. 110 There is no reason to believe that the present United States
bureaucracy lacks the capacity to tax wealth in addition to income.",
D. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO A WEALTH TAX
At the same time that Adam Smith was analyzing tax systems across
space and time, the United States Constitution was written to prohibit
wealth taxes."12 The restriction on wealth taxes was achieved by Article
I, Section 2, Clause 3 which requires apportionment of direct taxes by
population. 113 The constitutional restriction on direct taxes shows that
the political dilemma associated with wealth taxes in the United States
was not equivalent to the eighteenth-century British problem. According
to Smith, eighteenth-century Britain's difficulty with a wealth tax was that
wealth was hard to identify, value, and tax.114 In contrast, the political
drawback to taxing wealth in the eighteenth-century United States was
that wealth was all too readily identifiable and easy to value.
In the eighteenth-century United States, most wealth was held either in
land or slaves, both easy targets for taxation. The wealthiest Ameri-
cans-those with the largest acreage and slave holdings-resided in states
with the smallest white male populations. Their low white male popula-
tions, especially in relation to large tracks of land, put these wealthy
"planter states" at a numerical disadvantage in the House of Representa-
family has, in other words, the average black family has less than 17 [cents]." Id.; see also
infra text and accompanying notes Parts V(A)-(B) on the "Living Wage," income, and
wealth.
109. For a discussion of valuation in the context of a wealth-transfer tax, see Joseph M.
Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX L. REv. 241,
243 (1988).
110. See I.R.C. §§ 871-989 (2006) (internal revenue statutes providing the laws for the
treatment of foreign income).
111. See ACKERMAN & ALSTO-iF, supra note 3, at 105-07; see generally Dodge, supra
note 109.
112. See generally Ascher, supra note 25.
113. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
114. See supra note 24 (discussion of the difficulty of identifying sources of wealth).
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tives when compared to States with larger white male populations and
smaller acreage. A tax on land-the most significant form of eighteenth-
century American wealth-would have shifted the cost of government
away from the highly populated small states of the Northeast toward the
slave-holding South. A direct tax on slaves would have targeted an iso-
lated political minority and might have made slavery financially prohibi-
tive. At least two adjustments were placed in the United States
Constitution in order to avoid these outcomes.1 1 5 One provision was the
counting of slaves as three-fifths of a man for purposes of allocating rep-
resentatives. 116 The second provision was the prohibition against direct
taxes without apportionment, which effectively made a federal wealth tax
unconstitutional. 17
Both the eighteenth-century British and American objections to a
wealth tax have less appeal today. After the Civil War, the United States
developed a more national outlook that is less focused on interstate rival-
ries. Thus, individual states have less to fear from a federal tax on their
citizens' wealth as opposed to their income. In addition, although twenty-
first-century American wealth holdings are far more sophisticated than
their eighteenth-century British counterparts, the United States' ability to
track wealth is more sophisticated as well.1 1 8 Further, like eighteenth-
century Britain, the twenty-first-century United States already has sophis-
ticated, albeit local, agencies that annually value one significant source of
twenty-first-century American wealth-land and buildings.1 19 Thus,
neither the constitutional argument against a comprehensive wealth tax
nor the administrative argument is compelling in light of present realities.
SMITH'S THREE OBJECTIONS TO A BRITISH WEALTH TAX IN THE
AMERICAN CONTEXT
Smith believed that eighteenth-century Britain could not implement a
comprehensive wealth tax for at least three reasons: (1) cultural expecta-
tions; (2) capital flight; and (3) unstable values. In the United States con-
text these concerns are less compelling.
1. Cultural Expectations
If Smith was an accurate reporter, then the eighteenth-century British
were much more concerned with their privacy than twenty-first-century
Americans. For example, when Smith critiqued a house tax, he preferred
a tax that measured wealth by the number of windows rather than by the
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
116. Id. ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those
bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
other Persons.").
117. See generally Ascher, supra note 25.
118. See generally Dodge, supra note 109.
119. See supra note 82.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 61 S.M.U. L. Rev. 367 2008
SMU LAW REVIEW
number of fireplaces, because a tax collector could count windows with-
out entering a home.120 How could Smith understand a culture filled
with reality television and government agencies capable of monitoring
billions of telephone calls? In the face of the greatly-reduced expecta-
tions of privacy that prevail today, Smith's privacy concerns surrounding
a wealth tax become less compelling.1 21 Indeed, in the context of the
twenty-first-century United States, a comprehensive wealth tax with a
large exemption is actually less intrusive to the population as a whole,
because the large exemption reduces the size of the taxpaying public,
thereby conferring greater privacy on a large number of former
taxpayers.1 22
2. Capital Flight
As Smith noted, capital is mobile, both in search of profit and to escape
taxation. Because income is similarly mobile, the United States presently
imposes its federal income tax on its citizens' worldwide income.12 3 Thus,
Americans are not ignorant of (or adverse to) comprehensive and world-
wide tax bases. Of course, declaring that a government is empowered to
reach worldwide income or wealth and actually taxing foreign-based rev-
enue are two different matters. The United States has demonstrated an
ability to reach a substantial portion of overseas income, even in the face
of elaborate tax avoidance mechanisms.
A comprehensive wealth tax with a large exemption, augmenting an
income tax that exempts the "Living Wage," would create a prosperous
taxpayer population with a higher average ability to engage in elaborate
tax avoidance. In turn, this smaller but more sophisticated taxpayer pop-
ulation would force shifts in the regulating administrative agency. One of
those shifts would include more sophisticated work in identifying wealth,
both domestic and foreign. Surely incentives exist for capital flight under
a wealth tax to the same extent as they now exist for income flight under
the income tax. Compared to income, however, wealth remains less mo-
bile, even in our increasingly technological society. For example, one sig-
nificant part of a wealth base is land. 124
3. Unstable Property Values
The fact that land remains a significant source of wealth in this country
also applied to Smith's questions concerning the instability of valuation.
120. See supra note 74.
121. C.f Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Informa-
tion Increase Compliance? 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 95, 103-04 (2005) (arguing that people
demand high levels of privacy regarding their tax information).
122. See discussion infra Parts V(A)-(B) on "Living Wage."
123. I.R.C. §§ 861-862 (2000); see also Graetz, supra note 64, at 269-73.
124. For a discussion of the problems with the taxation of wealth, see Ascher, supra
note 25, at 100-21. For Smith's view of the greater ease of taxing land than other types of
wealth, see supra note 25. For a discussion of the advantages of taxing wealth in addition
to income, see ACKERMAN & ALSTO-r-r, supra note 3, at 94-112.
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As compared to eighteenth-century Britain, the twenty-first-century
United States has ways of tracking wealth in land, stocks, and other types
of property, both tangible and intangible, that were impossible to imagine
in the eighteenth century. 125 That these values might rise and fall over
time is not of great moment. Income also changes over time, and yet the
annual accounting periods are able to handle these fluctuations. 126
V. RACE AND WEALTH
The history section of this article demonstrated that a significant part of
our present-day federal tax system results from attempts to accommodate
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century slavery and large land holdings. A
happy consequence of a combined comprehensive wealth and consump-
tion tax, each with a large exemption, is that the combination lessens the
tax burdens on those who receive the least from society by shifting the tax
burden to those who benefit most. Two areas that demonstrate the
wealth tax's social justice appeal, when combined with a consumption tax
with an exemption large enough to shelter the "Living Wage," are: (1) the
debate between class-based and race-based affirmative action; and (2)
black reparations. As the sections below also note, although none of
these benefits flow exclusively to blacks, all three of these aspects of an
Adam Smith-style wealth tax are apt to redress the historical American
tendency to direct government benefits away from blacks and towards
similarly situated whites. 127
A. CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Since the introduction of race-based affirmative action, a counter-
vailing story is that justice is best served when government benefits are
based on class instead of race.128 The class argument calls for targeting
government benefits to people who live below a set income line, often the
poverty threshold itself, or 125% or 150% of that threshold. Sometimes
125. See Fellows, supra note 97, at 744-66.
126. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, HOUSEHOLD MOBILITY DURING THE 1980s: A
STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT BASED ON TAX RETURN DATA (1992) (showing a great deal of
mobility between income quintiles).
127. See infra note 149.
128. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 52 (2002) (when presented by progres-
sives as a political program, universalist arguments call for a focus on class in lieu of race);
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
83-182 (1996); CAROL M. SWAIN, THE NEW WHITE NATIONALISM IN AMERICA: ITS CHAL-
LENGE TO INTEGRATION 35 (2002) (whites and blacks both prefer that colleges admit poor
white applicants over middle class blacks); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based
on Economic Disadvantage, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1928-30 (1996); Richard D.
Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037, 1060-87 (1996);
Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452,
459-72 (1997) (noting that class-based affirmative action might not bring about income
integration in higher education); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action:
Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1847, 1850 (1996) (noting that measures of class tend
to be simplistic); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting With Class-Based Affirmative Action
47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 472-73 (1997).
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other income limits entirely unrelated to the poverty threshold stand in as
a proxy for class. 129 In this regard, race and class, measured by income,
are not unrelated.130
Using the lowest measure by income-the Census Bureau's poverty
threshold-45% of those below the poverty line are white, 25% are
black, 25% are Hispanic, and 5% are "other."' 131 That the forty-five per-
cent of poor people who are white make up just 9.3% of the entire white
population demonstrates the large population differences between
blacks, whites, and Hispanics in the United States.' 32
Using the second-most generous measure of poverty-the limits on the
EITC-the highest almost exclusively white income quintile enjoys over
fifty percent of four types of income. 133 In contrast, black and Hispanic
median income figures place below the EITC limits.' 34
Using the most generous "Living Wage" minimum, white families' me-
dian incomes meet the $45,000 "Living Wage" under three out of four
income measures. 135 Black and Hispanic median incomes do not reach
the "Living Wage" in any of the four income measures. 136
Given the large gaps in median income by race and ethnicity, why is
there such resistance to class-based affirmative action? At least one rea-
son is the overwhelming number of white people in the below-poverty
category. Poverty in the United States could be cut in half with programs
that exclusively service white Americans. In fact, targeting whites for so-
cial benefits is a tradition in United States welfare-transfer programs. 137
Thus, one fear of class-based affirmative action is that it will create a
system that shuts blacks out.
Another fear is illustrated in Dalton Conley's contrast between two
working-class families -one white and one black-that each face income
insecurity. 138 The white family's house, the product of a number of gov-
ernment-transfer programs targeted to whites over several generations,
allows that family to survive the sudden loss of income that destroys the
black family, which is forced to rent because neither its members nor its
ancestors received the government benefits conferred on their white
counterparts. Dalton Conley's story illustrates how class is often misun-
derstood as a function of income.139 When income determines class, the
129. See supra note 47.
130. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 43, at 9 tbl.4
131. LEVIN-WALDMAN, supra note 46, at 61.
132. See generally id.
133. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 43, at 6 tbl.3 (showing the share of Aggregate
Household Income by Quintile and the Gini: 2005).
134. Id. at tbl. 2 (showing the Index of Median Household Income by Selected Charac-
teristics and Income Definition: 2005).
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 4 tbl. 2.
137. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 51.
139. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 128, at 459-72;
Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, supra note 128, at 1850(demonstrating that measures of class tend to be simplistic).
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two families appear similarly situated, and the black family's misery be-
comes inexplicable. In contrast, if class is understood as a function of
ownership, then the two families share the same income but not the same
class. The class difference between the two families reflects a wealth gap
between whites and blacks that is significantly greater than other gaps
between blacks and whites, such as income and education.1 40 In fact, the
racialized wealth gap is so great that whites in the bottom quintile of in-
come have more wealth on average than blacks in the top quintile.
1 4 1
To the extent that the tax system becomes a tool of class justice, defin-
ing class through property ownership, this contributes to race-based af-
firmative action as well as class-based affirmative action because wealth
and race are so bound together in our society. 142 Taxing wealth allows
one government action-taxation-to counter balance another series of
government actions, depriving people of property both today and in the
past.
B. REPARATIONS
Apology and restitution are difficult concepts. 143 As House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi discovered when she tried to condemn an empire that died
in 1923, countries are loath to apologize for even their most distant rela-
tions.144 In twenty-first-century America, even mild attempts to apolo-
gize for slavery can provoke terrifying threats.1 45 Yet in the face of social
140. See generally William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, Racial Differences in Wealth:
A Brief Historical Overview and Elizabeth Kirkland & Sheila R. Peters, Location, Loca-
tion, Location: Residential Segregation and Wealth Disparity, both in RACE AND WEALTH
DISPARITIES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE (Beverly I. Moran, ed., forthcoming
2008); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 110-11.
141. CONLEY, supra note 51, at 1; see also OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 91-125.
142. RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE, supra note
140.
143. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS (2003); MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST RESTITU-
TION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P.
Alford eds., 2006); MARY FRANCES BERRY, MY FACE IS BLACK IS TRUE: CALLIE HOUSE
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EX-SLAVE REPARATIONS (2005); BORIS I. BITFKER, THE CASE
FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (2003); ROY L BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A
NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (2004); ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO
& CON (2006); JENNIFER HARVEY, WHITENESS AND MORALITY: PURSUING RACIAL JUS-
TICE THROUGH REPARATIONS AND SOVEREIGNTY (2007); CHARLES P. HENRY, LONG
OVERDUE: THE POLITICS OF RACIAL REPARATIONS (2007); CLARENCE J. MUNFORD,
RACE AND REPARATIONS (1996); REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY (Ronald P Salzberger, &
Mary C. Turck ed., 2004); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES To
BLACKS (2000); ROBERT SADAMU SHIMABUKURO, BORN IN SEATTLE: THE CAMPAIGN FOR
JAPANESE AMERICAN REDRESS (2001); WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY
OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks, ed., 1999)
[hereinafter WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH].
144. In 2007, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi introduced a bill condemning the Ottoman
Empire for genocide against its Armenian population. For information on the bill intro-
duced by the House Speaker, see Carl Hulse, As Turks Object, Genocide Motion Falters,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at P1.
145. See generally E. Gordon Gee, Carpetbaggery and Conflagration: Vanderbilt Uni-
versity Makes New Enemies of Old Friends, in UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS AS MORAL LEAD-
ERS (David G. Brown, ed., 2006) (describing death threats received by the Chancellor as a
20081
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and cultural obstacles, there are times when the United States has ac-
knowledged responsibility and provided redress.146 Nevertheless, when
the subject is American slavery, reparations raise serious disagree-
ments. 147 In the context of the capitalist ideal of universal prosperity and
result of an attempt to change the name of a dormitory from "Confederate Memorial Hall"
to "Memorial Hall").
146. For discussions of reparations to Japanese Americans, see Eric K. Yamamoto &
Liann Ebesugawa, Report on Redress: The Japanese American Internment, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF REPARATIONS 257-83 (Pablo De Greiff, ed., 2006). See also BROOKS, supra note
143, at 155; BROPHY, supra note 143, at 41-44; see generally MITCHELL T. MAKI, HARRY
H.L. KITANO & S. MEGAN BERTHOLD, ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: How JAPA-
NESE AMERICANS OBTAINED REDRESS (1999); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE,
RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 390-406(2001); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999); JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (Peter H. Irons ed., 1989). For discussions of Japanese
internment during World War II, see SCOTT P. CORBEIT, QUIET PASSAGES: THE Ex-
CHANGE OF CIVILIANS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN DURING THE SECOND
WORLD WAR (1987); TETSUDEN KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMER-
ICAN IMPRISONMENT DURING WORLD WAR 11 (2003); ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUI-
SITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II (2007);
KAREN L. RILEY, SCHOOLS BEHIND BARBED WIRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WARTIME
INTERNMENT AND THE CHILDREN OF ARRESTED ENEMY ALIENS (2002); NATSU TAYLOR
SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTANAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE
PREROGATIVE STATE (2007). For discussion of reparations and Native Americans, see
Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims for Reparations, Compensation, and Restitution in the
United States Legal System, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 143, at 261-69.
147. For discussions of objections to the modern black reparations movement, see, for
example Robert K. Fulliwinder, The Case for Reparations and Stephen Kirshner, The Case
Against Reparations, both in REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY: A READER, supra note 143;
JUAN WILLIAMS, ENOUGH: THE PHONY LEADERS, DEAD-END MOVEMENTS, AND CUL-
TURE OF FAILURE THAT ARE UNDERMINING BLACK AMERICA-AND WHAT WE CAN Do
ABOUT IT 67-85 (2006) (listing several objections to the black reparations movement in-
cluding that the movement is not serious in either a political or a cultural sense); Alfred L.
Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811, 814-18 (2006) (criticizing Posner &
Vermuele for using a too narrowly drawn definition of reparations); see generally Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 967 (2001); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 747 (2003) (criticizing current writings on reparations as based on
large-scale abstractions about justice and injustice); BROOKS, supra note 143, at 180-206
(listing objections to black reparations including: African involvement with the slave trade,
the universal acceptance of slavery during the nineteenth century, reparations unfairly pe-
nalizing white Americans whose families immigrated after the Civil War, absence of slaves
to compensate because all the slaves are dead, reparations as just an even more illegitimate
form of affirmative action, white soldiers paid reparations for the entire nation by their
deaths in the Civil War, the fact that slavery gave present day black Americans the oppor-
tunity to live in a prosperous country, class based reparations are more universal and fair,
blacks need to contribute to racial reconciliation, there is so much mixed blood in the
United States that everyone would be entitled to reparations, the amount of reparations is
impossible to calculate); BROPHY, supra note 143, at 76 (listing objections to reparations in
addition to those listed by Brooks, including: only a small minority of whites ever owned
slaves, black reparations are based on race and not injury, blacks owe a greater debt to the
United States than the country owes to blacks, reparations are just disguised separatism).
For a history of some of the calls for black reparations over the last thirty years, see gener-
ally, BITTKER, supra note 143; ROBINSON, supra note 143; John Torpey, Legalism and its
Discontents: The Case of Reparations for Black Americans, in THE LIMITS OF LAW 75-108(Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2005); Note, Bridging
the Color Line: The Power of African-American Reparations to Redirect America's Future,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1689, 1696-99 (2002); Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, From the
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political liberty, there is no doubt that slavery betrayed the United States'
Enlightenment ideals by denying millions of people the ability to obtain
wealth and pass that wealth down to future generations.148 These restric-
tions on the ability to accumulate and pass on wealth did not end with
slavery. Instead, a series of government programs reinforced the wealth
disparities between those citizens that arrived by migration and those
who arrived in chains. 149 In addition to the other government programs
that help maintain the wealth gap that began with slavery, we can add our
decision to tax income instead of wealth. Our federal tax laws continue to
exacerbate the wrongs started in slavery in a number of ways. First, by
confiscating a portion of the earnings that could otherwise go towards
accumulating wealth, the federal tax laws make it harder for each genera-
Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Out-
sider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 876-92 (1993); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe
Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 612-44
(1993); Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations? 40 B.C. L. REV. 429 (1998).
148. For a discussion of the impact on modern law of the creation of people as property,
see, for example, Patricia Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration of Property Archetypes
in Racial and Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REV. 81, 88 (1990); see generally Patricia J.
Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNS J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'y 5
(1988). For discussions of Enlightenment influences on the creation of the United States,
see, for example, AMERICA AND ENLIGHTENMENT CONSTITUTIONALISM 159-72 (Gary L.
Mcdowell & Johnathan O'Neill eds., 2006); see generally JACK FRUCHTMAN, JR., ATLANTIC
COUSINS: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND HIS VISIONARY FRIENDS (2005); GERTRUDE HIMMEL-
FARB, THE ROADS TO MODERNITY: THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN ENLIGHTEN-
MENTS (2004); DARREN STALOFF, HAMILTON, ADAMS, JEFFERSON: THE POLITICS OF
ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 3 (2005). For a discussion of the con-
nection between reparations theory and critical legal studies, see Mari J. Matsuda, Looking
to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323
(1987). See also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS-THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
149. In the context of social security, see Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair La-
bor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1337-38
(1987) (noting that legislative history of the social security Act shows that blacks were
deliberately excluded from benefits under the domestic and farm worker provisions, and
that even blacks that were eligible for Social Security assistance received significantly
lower benefits than whites). See also MEIZHA LUI ET AL., supra note 108, at 73-130 (dis-
cussing the historical events that have led to black wealth inequality in America including
slavery, blacks' inaccessibility to New Deal programs, and other state-sponsored discrimi-
nation in the areas of employment and housing); POOLE, supra note 96, at 174-87. For a
discussion of the role of the federal government in denying black Americans access to
wealth in housing, see DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 105 (1993); see gener-
ally Collins & Margo, supra note 140; Kirkland & Peters, supra note 140. For racist poli-
cies in education meant to perpetuate a black underclass, see, for example, Reavis Mitchell
& Roland Mitchell, History and Education: Mining the Gap: Historically Black Colleges as
Centers of Excellence for Engaging Disparities in Race and Wealth, in RACE AND WEALTH
DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE, supra note 140.
For general discussions of the wealth gap between blacks and whites in the United States,
see, for example, CONLEY, supra note 51, at 55-81; CHUCK COLLINS, BETSY LEONDAR-
WRIGHT, AND HOLLY SKALR, SHIFTING FORTUNES: THE PERILS OF THE GROWING AMERI-
CAN WEALTH GAP (1999); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 100-10; Francine D. Blau
& John W. Graham, Black White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composition, 105 Q.J.
ECON. 321, 337 (1990) (noting the large differences in wealth acquisition that cannot be
explained by income, education, region, or marriage).
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tion to make up for past lost opportunities. Second, government pro-
grams that created wealth for whites added to the black/white wealth gap.
Third, by treating income from wealth much more favorably than earned
income, the current system can result in working people paying higher
rates than their wealthy employers.150 Thus, the federal income tax both
shelters wealth for those who are already wealthy and attacks the means
of obtaining wealth for those who lack it. At least some of the objections
to reparations and the flaws in our federal tax system are answered with a
wealth tax.
First, a wealth tax eliminates the special benefits that the Internal Rev-
enue Code now confers on property owners.151 Thus, the great wealth
gap between blacks and whites (and males and females) no longer acts
through the tax system as a way of protecting white wealth to the detri-
ment of blacks. Instead, a wealth tax places the tax burden directly where
Smith would recommend, that is, on the greatest beneficiary of govern-
ment largess: the property owner. Second, a consumption tax with an ex-
emption up to the "Living Wage" shelters a great deal of income in the
black community, which relies on wages for income more than other eth-
nic groups and is generally forced to spend its income below the "Living
Wage" on consumption. 152 Third, the protection of an amount of wealth
needed to support entrance into the housing market would excuse a large
portion of the black population from taxation, thereby providing a period
of time for blacks as a group to build up their wealth base after centuries
of restrictions on black wealth accumulation. 153 Further, having both a
wealth and a consumption tax equalizes the decision of whether to save
or spend income. Once earnings grow past the "Living Wage" amount,
savings are exempted up to the amount needed to enter the housing mar-
150. Such rules as deferring the unrealized gains in wealth, often allowing those unreal-
ized gains to completely escape tax through the date of death basis rules of I.R.C. § 1014,
and taxing the income flowing from wealth at less than half the maximum rates for earned
income, I.R.C. § 1(h), have all led Warren Buffet (reportedly the third richest man on
earth) to ask why he pays a lower tax rate than his secretary. Tom Bawden, Buffet Blasts
System that Lets Him Pay Less Tax Than Secretary, TIMES OF LONDON, June 28, 2007, at 1.
See also The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 994 (2004); see
generally Martin McMahon, The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 105 TAX NOTES
1383 (Dec. 6, 2004); Moran & Whitford, supra note 96, at 755 (noting ways that the bene-
fits for wealth create greater tax liabilities for black taxpayers).
151. See generally, e.g., Moran & Whitford, supra note 96.
152. See generally, e.g., Brown & Cornfield, A Selective Review of Sociological Perspec-
tives on the Relationship Between Race and Wealth, in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE, supra note 140 (discussing how various United States
ethnic groups attempt to increase wealth, with Koreans being the most likely to engage in
entrepreneurship and blacks aided most by unionized labor).
153. For general information about the growing gap between the rich and the poor in
the United States based on income, see, for example, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 12 (noting that incomes of the top one percent of Americans from 2004 to 2005
exceeded the total income of the poorest twenty percent of Americans); COLLINS & YES-
KEL, supra note 12, at 39-67; BORN ON THIRD BASE: THE SOURCE OF WEALTH OF THE
1997 FORBES 400 (1997). For specific information on the larger wealth gap between blacks
and whites in the United States, see generally OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note, at 100-10;
see generally CONLEY, supra note 51; Collins & Margo, supra note 140.
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ket, and are then taxed along with consumption over the "Living Wage."
Expenditures beyond the "Living Wage" and housing limits are not influ-
enced by tax result. Finally, although government was a main force in
stripping blacks of their wealth for all of these centuries, government was
(and is) also the cause of black wealth. As Smith reminds us, all wealth
flows from government. For example, the Civil War Amendments and
the civil rights laws are real sources of black wealth. 154 Without those
government actions, blacks would have less wealth than they do today, no
matter how small of a portion that wealth is in contrast to their white
counterparts. With a wealth tax, blacks would pay the tax that is most
closely associated with the benefits that the government conferred on
them, while also receiving the lower tax bills that come from the recogni-
tion that lower wealth rates are also a result of government action against
them.
VI. COMPARING THE INCOME/CONSUMPTION TAX AND
THE WEALTH/CONSUMPTION TAX AT THE
"LIVING WAGE"
A capitalist tax system exempts the wages and necessaries needed to
support a minimum material standard from both direct and indirect taxes.
Establishing the correct standard is dependent on time, place, and cul-
ture. In the twenty-first-century United States, the differences between
the poverty threshold, the minimum wage, the EITC limits, and the vari-
ous "Living Wage" calculations illustrate that the real cost of living an
acceptable American life is hard to calculate. Of the four possibilities
(poverty line, minimum wage, EITC or the "Living Wage") the "Living
Wage" is the most likely to completely protect necessaries. In order to
apply capitalist principles to taxation in support of Smith's universal pros-
perity project, this section uses the "Living Wage" as an exemption
154. The Civil War Amendments are: Amendment XIII ("Neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States .... ); Amendment XIV ("All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States .... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); and Amendment XV ("The right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."). See also
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71
Stat. 634 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74
Stat. 86 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2000)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000)); Civil Rights Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000));
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971)
(2000); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 note) (2000); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 et seq. (2000)).
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amount under the hybrid income tax/consumption tax, and the combined
wealth and consumption tax.
A. HYBRID INCOME/CONSUMPTION TAX
The current hybrid income/consumption tax already shelters a "Living
Wage."'155 It also exempts some transfer payments while taxing other
transfers. 156 The current hybrid income/consumption tax exempts most
wealth accumulation, especially wealth in excess of the amount needed to
support the "Living Wage." The failure to tax wealth in excess of the
amount needed to support the "Living Wage" and the failure to exempt
the wealth needed to support the "Living Wage" violate Smith's tax bene-
fit ideal. Although the present hybrid income/consumption tax is not
able to separate out the wealth that should be taxed from the wealth that
should be exempt, it can accept capitalist adjustments for wages in the
form of a large exemption for the social security wage tax, a refundable
EITC up to $45,000, and the elimination of excise taxes on necessary
commodities. In contrast, another significant problem within the system
as a whole is the number of state, local, and federal taxes, in addition to
income taxes, that are either direct or indirect taxes on wages.157 In order
to truly exempt the "Living Wage" under the current United States tax
system, adjustments must be made in the following areas:
(1) The social security wage tax must be adjusted. The current tax
applies a flat rate of 15.3% to all wage income up to a total of
$97,500. Protecting the "Living Wage" requires exempting the first
$45,000 of wages from the social security wage tax for a two-parent
family of four and then applying the flat rate to all wage income over
that threshold. 158
155. See supra note 50; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 6 tbl.1 (Ef-
fective Federal Tax Rates, 2004 and 2005) (showing that households with less than $37,000
paid a negative rate on the individual income tax and that households with less than
$58,000 paid an effective 3% rate in the individual income tax).
156. Transfer payments that are subject to tax include social security retirement bene-
fits and unemployment compensation. Benefits that are not subject to tax include school
lunch programs.
157. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 12, at 6 tbl.1 (Effective Federal Tax
Rates, 2004 and 2005) (showing that households with less than $15,800 paid an 8% effec-
tive rate on social insurance taxes and a 2.3% effective rate on federal excise taxes).
158. The maximum amount of earnings that are subject to social security tax rises in
step with increases in national average wages. The maximum earnings for tax years 2006,
2007 and 2008 are:
Maximum Earnings Taxable
Program 2006 2007 2008
Social Security $94,200 $97,500 $102,000
Medicare No Limit for any year after 1993
The social security tax rate is 6.2% on the employer and an additional 6.2% on the em-
ployee, and the Medicare tax rate is 1.45% on the employer and an additional 1.45% on
the employee. The total tax rate borne by wages up to the cap is 15.3%. For the source of
these calculations, see U.S. Social Security Administration, Find An Answer to Your Ques-
tion., http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/ssa.cfg/php/enduser/std-alp.php?p-sid=*Bjhk46
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(2) The excise and sales tax systems must also be changed. Elimina-
tion of state, federal, and local sales and excise taxes on necessary
commodities and indirect taxes on wages should be replaced with
luxury consumption taxes.
(3) The income tax must be adjusted as well. The amount that a
two-parent family of four can earn and still be eligible for the refund-
able EITC should be increased up to the "Living Wage" amount of
$45,000, thereby continuing to use the tax system as an indirect wel-
fare system for the working poor.159
What the current hybrid income/consumption tax does not do is sepa-
rate out the wealth that should be taxed from the wealth that should be
sheltered. In fact, the current system is much more likely to tax the
wealth that should be sheltered and to shelter the wealth that should be
taxed. For example, the start-up funds needed to enter the housing mar-
ket will most likely reside in an interest-bearing account that is taxed an-
nually. Once the family enters the housing market however, the
appreciation in the house escapes federal taxation for years, if not for-
ever. As a result of these distinctions between types of wealth, the family
that needs the most help gets taxed and the family that is already secure
avoids tax.
B. CONSUMPTION AND COMPREHENSIVE WEALTH TAX
In a combined wealth and consumption tax, the amounts needed for
working people to sustain a decent life through consumption are exempt
from taxes as necessaries, as is the amount needed to enter into the hous-
ing market and thereby acquire a property "safety net. '160 Once those
two thresholds are passed, the system is indifferent as between invest-
ment and consumption, taxing each at a flat rate. Thus, the taxpayers
who are in actual need of protection from taxation because they have yet
to accumulate the wealth needed for a decent working class life receive
an exemption from taxation, and the system remains neutral as to individ-
ual choice beyond that barrier.
(last visited June 20, 2008). Some presidential candidates have toyed with the idea of apply-
ing the Social Security wage tax to the entire amount of wages, but none have suggested
exempting a base amount needed to protect a "Living Wage." Joel Achenbach, That's
Rich-but Maybe Not for Someone Else; Issue of Who's Really Wealthy Can Also Affect
Political Debate, WASH. PosT, Nov. 26, 2007, at A02 (contrasting Hillary Clinton and Ba-
rack Obama on their views on lifting the cap on the social security wage tax).
159. See generally Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the
Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867 (2005).
160. CONLEY, supra note 51, at 1. The exemption amount for a comprehensive wealth
tax in the contemporary United States based on a cultural understanding of necessaries for
two adults with two children should include $68,000 of wealth and $45,000 annual income.
See discussion supra Parts V(A)-(B) on the "Living Wage."
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C. WHO Is LEFT BEHIND IN A COMPREHENSIVE WEALTH TAX WITH
A LARGE EXEMPTION?
An exemption large enough to support saving for a house does not give
the taxpayer a house, but it does acknowledge that there is a sphere of
political liberty and economic advantage that our government is meant to
keep tax exempt. 161 In the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, that sphere often included wealth transfers to white households and
companies.
Farms and other enterprises that hold wealth that produces little in-
come are strongly affected by a shift to a wealth tax. On the other hand,
keeping debt out of the tax base creates less incentive to borrow in con-
trast to the present tax system, which encourages borrowing to acquire
wealth, particularly wealth in real estate.162 In today's predatory lending
climate, tax rules that discourage borrowing might provide economic as
well as tax benefits.
VII. CONCLUSION
If the twenty-first century United States Congress asked the father of
capitalism to construct a new tax system for a new century, Adam Smith
would advocate a comprehensive wealth tax with a large exemption and a
flat rate, combined with a consumption tax with a refundable credit up to
the "Living Wage." Smith would advocate a comprehensive wealth tax
because it supports his larger project of achieving universal prosperity
and political freedom through capitalism, and because the administrative,
political, and cultural conditions in the twenty-first century United States
make a comprehensive wealth tax feasible in ways that were once impos-
sible. The twentieth century gave us an income tax because of the ideals
and constraints of its time. After one hundred years of technological,
political, and cultural change, a federal comprehensive wealth tax-unat-
tainable in the twentieth century-becomes both possible and compelling
in the twenty-first century.
The twentieth-century income tax reflects concerns that are no longer
relevant to American democracy, such as the proper amount of political
cover to give slaveholders and large landholding elites. A twenty-first-
century tax could reflect concerns such as the desire to reduce the income
inequality and wealth inequality in the United States, particularly when
that inequality comes from slavery and other violations of human rights.
Although it is certainly true that any sophisticated tax in a complex soci-
161. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 169 (1974) (theorizing that
the taxation of wages is a kind of state sponsored slavery).
162. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2000) (qualified mortgage interest deduction). I.R.C.
§ 164(a)(1) (2000) (deduction for state and local property taxes); I.R.C. § 121 (2000) (ex-
clusion for gains from the sale of owner occupied housing); I.R.C. § 1014 (2000) (date of
death basis). For a contrasting view, see the Amount at Risk Rules of I.R.C. § 465 (2000)
and the Passive Activity Loss Rules of 1.R.C. § 469 (2000) for tax rules that limit the tax
benefits of financed real estate.
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ety will produce similar costs, given that all sophisticated taxes are expen-
sive to administer, is the price well spent on a system that responds to the
past as much as the present? Is it time to consider another path, not
because the income tax is inherently flawed, but because it was created
for a different time and place? In the twenty-first century, when govern-
ment has so much more access to information about assets and where the
politics and culture are less protective of privacy, there is an opportunity
to consider a tax system that not only raises revenues, but is also part of a
larger project. If that larger project is universal prosperity through capi-
talism, then the father of capitalism would direct us to tax the rich while
sheltering the poor and working classes.
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